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  • 1990-1994  (2)
  • 1990  (2)
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  • 1990-1994  (2)
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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cores and large cores when population varies (1990)
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 19 (1990), S. 219-232 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract In a TU cooperative game with populationN, a monotonic core allocation allocates each surplusv (S) among the agents of coalitionS in such a way that agenti's share never decreases when the coalition to which he belongs expands. We investigate the property of largeness (Sharkey [1982]) for monotonic cores. We show the following result. Given a convex TU game and an upper bound on each agent' share in each coalition containing him, if the upper bound depends only upon the size of the coalition and varies monotonically as the size increases, then there exists a monotonic core allocation meeting this system of upper bounds. We apply this result to the provision of a public good problem.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01761077
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Fair division under joint ownership: Recent results and open problems (1990)
    Springer
    Social choice and welfare 7 (1990), S. 149-170 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-217X
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract Two microeconomic models of joint ownership are discussed: the division of unproduced commodities and the joint production of a single output by a single input. In both models the two principal interpretations of fairness are Equal Split Guarantee (ESG) and No Envy (NE). When combined with Pareto optimality these axioms are however not compatible with some appealing monotonicity properties. Resource monotonicity (more cake to share makes everyone happy) is incompatible with either ESG or NE, and Population Monotonicity (one more mouth to feed makes everyone unhappy) is incompatible with NE. This in turn suggests three disjoint classes of fair solutions. This paper contains very few new results, it is mostly a survey of recent literature.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01560582
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
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