ISSN:
1468-0343
Source:
Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
Topics:
Political Science
Notes:
In the literature on directly unproductive profit seeking or rent seeking, intervention-seeking by labor and industry groups is generally restricted to direct lobbying activity. However, import-competing producers may have an additional instrument to influence the decision to grant protection. Under well-established injury criteria for protection import-competing producers have an incentive, either collectively or individually, to feign injury. To the extent that the free-rider problem can be overcome, orchestrating the appearance of injury is an intervention-seeking activity that may be complementary to DUP lobbying. When the established indicators of industry well-being include variables controlled by the prospective beneficiaries, therefore, free trade under the prospect of protection is potentially accompanied by a concomitant spurious-injury distortion. Some of the positive and welfare implications of the theory of spurious injury are investigated in both a partial equilibrium framework and in the Heckscher-Ohlin model.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1991.tb00042.x
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