ISSN:
1467-6486
Source:
Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
Topics:
Economics
Notes:
Professional organizations have long been depicted as rife with conflict between professionals, who are assumed to represent the interests of their profession, and managers, who are assumed to represent the potentially competing interests of the organization. This study examines the validity of this assumption. Based on past research on both professional organizations and knowledge structure development, we predict that to the extent that professionals and managers conflict, they may do so because they interpret ‘identical’ issues differently. The results of a study of resource allocation decision preferences with 350 chief financial officers, chief medical officers, and physicians revealed strong support for our issue interpretation predictions, and virtually no support for the simple professional–manager dichotomy. Specifically, using structural equation modeling, we found that: (1) single resource allocation issues could be interpreted in multiple ways; (2) issue interpretations were strong predictors of decision preferences; (3) professionals and managers tended to interpret issues differently, although many of the differences were not consistent with past theorizing about professionals; (4) the interpretations and decision preferences of professionals who occupied management positions were like those of other professionals but different from those of managers; and (5) decision maker status (i.e., professional and/or manager) was only modestly related to decision preference. Our findings suggest that the sources and manifestations of a professional–manager dichotomy are more complex than previously reported.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-6486.00220
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