Library

X
feed icon rss

Your email was sent successfully. Check your inbox.

An error occurred while sending the email. Please try again.

Proceed reservation?

Export
Filter
  • 2000-2004  (2)
  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Changes over time in the decision to adopt curbside recycling (2000)
    Springer
    Atlantic economic journal 28 (2000), S. 239-253 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-9678
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This study uses observations on California cities to estimate a model of the municipal decision to adopt curbside recycling. The model is estimated separately for two time periods: before and after a state waste-diversion mandate was imposed (that is, early and later adoption). It finds that citizen preferences matter greatly in early adoption decisions, but does not matter at all after the mandate was imposed. Landfill disposal opportunity costs, operating costs, and competitive disposal outlets are not significant in explaining early or later adoption. This study uses county-level data to confirm the results of the municipal-level analysis.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02298364
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Revenue Neutral Deposit/Refund Systems (2000)
    Springer
    Environmental and resource economics 17 (2000), S. 183-193 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-1502
    Keywords: deposit refund system ; externalities ; environmental regulation ; policy instruments
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering , Economics
    Notes: Abstract Deposit/refund systems are desirable instruments forenvironmental regulation where monitoring of emissions is difficult. Such systems may gain additional politicalacceptability, however, if implemented so that no net revenues accrue to the government. The revenue neutralityconstraint causes the deposit to drop below the efficient level, and the refund to rise. The extent to which thisconstraint leads to efficiency losses varies with the price elasticity of demand, with compliance costs, with thedegree of correlation between willingness to pay and compliance costs, and with the magnitude of theexternalities.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008338622801
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
Close ⊗
This website uses cookies and the analysis tool Matomo. More information can be found here...