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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Economic theory 13 (1999), S. 345-363 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: Keywords and Phrases: Voting ; Central limit theorem ; Paradoxes. ; JEL Classification Numbers: D71 ; D72.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. A disturbing phenomenon in voting, which causes most of the problems as well as the interest in the field, is that election outcomes (for fixed preferences) can change with the way the ballots are tallied. This causes difficulties because with each possible choice, some set of voters can be dubious about whether it is the “correct” one. But, how likely are these settings allowing multiple election outcomes? By combining properties of the geometry of voting developed by Saari with a analytic-geometric technique created by Schlafli, we determine the likelihood that a three candidate election can cause these potentially dubious outcomes.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Economic theory 8 (1996), S. 51-76 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: Key words Copeland method ; Borda count ; Dictionary ; Positional Voting ; Voting paradoxes.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary.  A central political and decision science issue is to understand how election outcomes can change with the choice of a procedure or the slate of candidates. These questions are answered for the important Copeland method (CM) where, with a geometric approach, we characterize all relationships among the rankings of positional voting methods and the CM. Then, we characterize all ways CM rankings can vary as candidates enter or leave the election. In this manner new CM strengths and flaws are detected.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Economic theory 8 (1996), S. 51-76 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: Copeland method ; Borda count ; Dictionary ; Positional Voting ; Voting paradoxes
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary A central political and decision science issue is to understand how election outcomes can change with the choice of a procedure or the slate of candidates. These questions are answered for the important Copeland method (CM) where, with a geometric approach, we characterize all relationships among the rankings of positional voting methods and the CM. Then, we characterize all ways CM rankings can vary as candidates enter or leave the election. In this manner new CM strengths and flaws are detected.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
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