ISSN:
1432-0479
Keywords:
Keywords and Phrases: Voting
;
Central limit theorem
;
Paradoxes.
;
JEL Classification Numbers: D71
;
D72.
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Economics
Notes:
Summary. A disturbing phenomenon in voting, which causes most of the problems as well as the interest in the field, is that election outcomes (for fixed preferences) can change with the way the ballots are tallied. This causes difficulties because with each possible choice, some set of voters can be dubious about whether it is the “correct” one. But, how likely are these settings allowing multiple election outcomes? By combining properties of the geometry of voting developed by Saari with a analytic-geometric technique created by Schlafli, we determine the likelihood that a three candidate election can cause these potentially dubious outcomes.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050258
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