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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Reputation, Honesty, and Efficiency with Insider Information: an Experiment (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We conduct an experimental study of sales of insider information about an asset's future value, where the insiders cannot purchase the underlying asset. We examine whether such information is purchased, the quality of the information provided, and the subsequent accuracy of purchase decisions in the underlying asset market. Our design explores whether reputation, in a repeated game of finite (but uncertain) duration, is an effective constraint on deliberate strategic misinformation. The insiders have an immediate incentive to state that the asset value is high when its true value is low. We suggest an application to insider trading in financial information markets. With fixed matching, cooperative outcomes featuring truthful revelation are frequently achieved and sustained, even though this suggests subjects have sophisticated beliefs about the beliefs and behavior of others. As a comparison, we also conduct a control treatment with random rematching. Here, information purchase is less frequent, the rate of truthful revelation decreases, and efficiency is diminished. Our results suggest that most people anticipate that others realize the potential value of a good reputation.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00425.x
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Twenty-Second Annual Conference of the European Association of Law and Economics, Ljubljana, Slovenia (2007)
    Berkeley, Calif. : Berkeley Electronic Press (now: De Gruyter)
    Review of law and economics 3.2007, 1, art1 
    Details
    ISSN: 1555-5879
    Source: Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals
    Topics: Law , Economics
    Notes: Introduction to the Twenty-Second Annual Conference of the European Association of Law and Economics, Ljubljana, Slovenia
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol3/iss1/art1
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement (1997)
    Oxford, UK and Boston, USA : Blackwell Publishers Ltd
    Journal of economic surveys 11 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1467-6419
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The economic literature on optimal law enforcement is very recent. Becker's seminal paper on crime and law enforcement dates from 1968 and most papers which are the focus of this survey have been published in the last ten years.The core result presented by Becker is the following: the probability and the severity of punishment deter crime. Therefore, the fine should be maximal since it is a costless transfer whereas the probability of detection and conviction is costly. Much of the recent work has attempted to show why Becker's result may not hold.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-6419.00034
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
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