ISSN:
1574-0277
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Economics
Notes:
Conclusions The previous sections of this paper have examined the relationship between virtually every published plan forecast, and the outcomes between 1952 and 1978, and offered an assessment of the additional information provided by the aggregate and certain industrial projections. Simple forecast-outcome ratios suggest that the projections became increasingly accurate at all levels of aggregation from the Second to Fourth Plans, after which the degree of predictive error rose. Generally, plans were pessimistic about growth prospects before 1970, but optimistic after that date. The planners were least successful in forecasting imports, Government expenditure, sectoral labour availability and productivity, and industrial rank orders during periods of unbalanced growth. Our evaluation of the Third, Fourth and Sixth Plans was relatively favourable, despite the large predictive errors, but left an unfavourable impression of the Fifth and Seventh Plans. It was shown that the projections of the Third, and especially the Fourth, Plans were relatively closer to the outcomes than forecasts that decision-makers could have constructed for themselves at the same date, and provided generally accurate information about the Government's medium term policy objectives. Though extremely inaccurate, the Sixth Plan neither was seriously inferior to alternative projections, nor incorrectly stated policy objectives. However, the aggregate and industrial projections in the Fifth Plan were generally inferior to Alternative forecasts, and were partially misleading about Government objectives over the period. Preliminary evidence suggests that the same will be true of the Seventh Plan. This evidence suggests that the praise lavished on French planning during the early 1960's was not altogether undeserved at the time. Though the plan forecasts were never perfectly accurate, there is a strong indication that the expectations-augmenting effects of the procedure were significant until 1965. However, the ability of planners to provide useful information in subsequent years was undermined by a change in Government attitudes, reflecting a hostility towards the process, and the increasing openness of the French economy. The former factor partly led to the poor performance of the Fifth Plan, which must have undermined the domestic credibility of the entire procedure. The latter meant that outcomes were increasingly determined by exogenous factors, which could not be affected by a manipulation of domestic expectations.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00351462
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