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  • 1
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    London : Periodicals Archive Online (PAO)
    Journal of theological studies. n.s.:29 (1978) 288 
    ISSN: 0022-5185
    Topics: Theology and Religious Studies
    Notes: AUTHORS AND BOOKS REVIEWED OR NOTICED
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Philosophy 4 (1929), S. 581-581 
    ISSN: 0031-8191
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Philosophy
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 3
    ISSN: 0031-8191
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Philosophy
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Philosophy 41 (1966), S. 127-139 
    ISSN: 0031-8191
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Philosophy
    Notes: For a century or so after his death Hegel's system excited, if not wider diversity of interpretation and more bitter controversy, then certainly more bewilderment, than had ever before befogged the battlefields of speculative thought. A few fervent disciples maintained that their master had achieved a system substantially if not in all detail final and complete, a philosophy destined to set at rest forever all serious philosophic doubt. Others agreed that this claim to finality was inherent in the system, but mocked openly, proclaiming Hegel an arrogant megalomaniac.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Philosophy 3 (1928), S. 443-456 
    ISSN: 0031-8191
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Philosophy
    Notes: § 22. Logic for Bradley, who follows the Kantian tradition, means primarily a theory of judgment. His definition of judgment is made so wide that it really covers inference as well. The “reference of an ideal content to reality,” as soon as that content is taken as complex and as not atomic, covers inference denned as ideal self-development of an object. Though the definition of judgment has a subjective flavour due to the way in which Bradley finds it necessary to distinguish it from psychical fact, he does not mean to imply that it is any less objective than inference. We learn from the second edition of the Logic that judgment so far as it is mediated is inference, and that mere unmediated judgment is nothing. Judgment, he says, though distinct from inference in form, is everywhere inference really though not explicitly; and almost the first words of the Terminal Essay on Judgment are: “Whatever else and however much else an inference may be, an inference still is a judgment.”
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Philosophy 3 (1928), S. 313-323 
    ISSN: 0031-8191
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Philosophy
    Notes: § 1. The purpose of this paper is to inquire what distinction can or should be drawn between logic on the one hand and on the other psychology, so far as psychology concerns itself specifically with the problem of knowledge. The suggestions I have to make are very provisional, and are based mainly on a criticism of the late Mr. Bradley's views of the nature and scope of logic and psychology. For this reason I have for my title adapted from Bradley's article on “Association and Thought” a famous phrase which seems to me to illustrate fairly well the meeting-point of these two sciences in his thinking. At the same time this very criticism is itself chiefly founded upon philosophical considerations with which Bradley at least as much as any other writer has taught me to sympathize. In short, I assume some sort of Absolute Idealism; and my excuse must be the further assumption—which I hope the reader will more readily tolerate— that the proper criticism of any theory is that which it can be shown to pass upon itself in the course of its own development.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Philosophy 12 (1937), S. 291-301 
    ISSN: 0031-8191
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Philosophy
    Notes: I Have often wished that someone would write a History of Oxford Honour Schools. But I want that work written for reasons which the title does not immediately suggest.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Philosophy 50 (1975), S. 356-357 
    ISSN: 0031-8191
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Philosophy
    Notes: Philosophy, October 1974, contains an article entitled ‘Aristotle's Four Becauses’, by Professor Max Hocutt, who contends that Aristotle's aitia (or aition) means ‘a because’ or ‘an explanation’ rather than ‘a cause’ and should be translated accordingly. He argues (a) that only Aristotle's efficient ‘cause’ is a cause in the English sense of the word, and (b) that ‘Aristotle's theory of “causes” is simply an application of his theory of syllogistic to the analysis of scientific knowledge’ (p. 389). Both contentions deserve a word.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Philosophy 25 (1950), S. 353-354 
    ISSN: 0031-8191
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Philosophy
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Philosophy 9 (1934), S. 450-460 
    ISSN: 0031-8191
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Philosophy
    Notes: § 21. Until a few years ago the hope of the physicist seems on the whole to have been that he would eventually be able to exhibit a single interconnected system of perfectly deterministic causal laws. He took the relation of cause and effect in all change to be such that from a determinate antecedent state of that which changes there must necessarily follow a different subsequent state of it, and it was assumed by him that complete knowledge of the antecedent state must enable exact prediction of the subsequent state. I do not think it matters here whether that which changes was taken as a limited subject of change or as the whole physical world.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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