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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Why Do Policy Makers Give (Permanent) Power to Policy Advisers? (2001)
    Oxford, UK and Boston, USA : Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
    Economics & politics 13 (2001), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1468-0343
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Political Science
    Notes: Using a simple game-theoretical model, this paper analyzes the role of policy advisers in the policy-making process. We show that policy makers are inclined to appoint advisers whose preferences coincide with their own preferences. Furthermore, we show that policy makers are biased towards erecting permanent advisory units. This result stems from the policy makers' desire to affect the actions of their successors. A permanent advisory unit induces future policy makers to act in accordance with the preferences of current policy makers. The policy-makers' bias towards erecting permanent advisory units may drive a wedge between actual policy outcomes and socially desired policy outcomes.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0343.00084
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Economic Policy, Model Uncertainty and Elections (1998)
    Oxford, UK and Boston, USA : Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
    Economics & politics 10 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1468-0343
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Political Science
    Notes: We analyse a game theoretical model in which policy makers have superior knowledge about the working of the economy relative to voters. We show that parties increase their chances of reelection by basing their policies on the model that best fits in with their preferences. Moreover, we show that if parties care much about holding office, they may deliberately base their policies on a model that is electorally attractive, even if this model does not describe the working of the economy correctly. Our paper provides an explanation for the observation that different political parties subscribe to different economic philosophies.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0343.00039
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Partisan views on the economy (1994)
    Springer
    Public choice 81 (1994), S. 137-150 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract In this paper it is argued that political parties may have incentives to adopt a partisan view on the working of the economic system. Our approach is based on a dynamical spatial voting model in which political parties are policy oriented. This model revolves around two interrelated issues x and y. The policy maker sets x directly. There exist two views on the relationship between x and y. Model uncertainty confronts policy makers with the problem of the selection of a model to base their actions on. We show that if voters have imperfect information about the working of the economic system that model selection contains a strategic element. Policy makers are inclined to adopt a view on the working of the economic system which fits in with their preferences. There is no inherent logic that places monetarists to the right of New Economists. They have different models of economic mechanism, but they need not have different political values. A conservative can be a Keynesian and a liberal a monetarist. These combinations are in fact surprisingly rare. James Tobin, 1974,The New Economics One Decade Older, p. 62.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01053270
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Government spending cycles: Ideological or opportunistic? (1996)
    Springer
    Public choice 89 (1996), S. 183-200 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper examines whether partisan and opportunistic motives affect government expenditure growth in the Netherlands. The time series analysis, covering the period 1953–1993, allows for different types of government spending. In general, spending is inspired by ideological and opportunistic motives: all government expenditure categories show an upward drift during election times and the ‘partisan’ motives behind government spending are clearly revealed: left-wing cabinets attach greater importance to social security and health care than right-wing cabinets and right-wing cabinets value expenditure on infrastructure and defense more than left-wing parties.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00114285
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Learning and signalling by advisor selection (1997)
    Springer
    Public choice 92 (1997), S. 353-368 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract In this paper we consider a model where a policy maker uses advice in order to (1) obtain information about the consequences of an innovation (information motive) and (2) to support political legitimacy of her decision (persuasion motive). We conduct our analysis in the context of a cheap-talk game with three players: (1) a policy maker, (2) the median voter in parliament or of the electorate and (3) an advisor. The advisor has private information about the consequences of policy. Communication between an advisor and a recipient improves as their preferences are closer aligned. If the preferences of the policy maker and the median voter are different the policy maker faces a trade-off. On the one hand, she wants to gain information to judge whether the innovation is worthwhile. On the other hand, she needs to convince the median voter whether the innovation is desirable.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1004996522167
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    When policy advisors cannot reach a consensus (2000)
    Springer
    Social choice and welfare 17 (2000), S. 439-461 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-217X
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract. In this paper advisors are selected by two ministers with conflicting interests in order to (1) acquire information, and (2) obtain political legitimacy concerning a project. In the end, parliament decides whether or not the project, of which the consequences are uncertain, is implemented. In principle a minister wants to appoint an advisor whose preferences are similar. However, since the advisor needs to convince the decisive player in the model, the minister may appoint an advisor whose preferences are closer to those of the agents to be persuaded. We also show when polarised advice occurs (the advisors have different preferences) and when consensual advice occurs (they have the same preferences).
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550050172
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Rational voters in a partisanship model (1995)
    Springer
    Social choice and welfare 12 (1995), S. 13-27 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-217X
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper examines a voter model for the US which is interconnected with the partisan theory. In our model, voters are rational and forward-looking. They are perfectly informed about the preferences of political parties and about the state of the economy. The predictions of our voter model differ from the predictions of conventional voter models, according to which the incumbent benefits from low unemployment and low inflation, irrespective of its political colour. In a partisan setting, the democratic party benefits from high unemployment and the republican party benefits from high inflation. Regressions of presidential approval rates indicate that the predictions of both the partisan voter model and the conventional model are consistent with the data.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00182190
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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