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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Ratio 6 (1993), S. 0 
    ISSN: 1467-9329
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Philosophy
    Notes: Kaplan claims that (1) ‘I am here now’, though analytic, is not a necessary truth. But this sentence is not a proposition, in a sense of proposition in which some, but not all, sentences are propositions. Since it is not a proposition, it is not true, and consequently not analytic. It is in fact a fragment of a proposition, the same fragment as ‘he was there then’ in (2) ‘CJFW said in Oxford on 23 September 1991 that he was there then’. Sentences containing indexicals in general owe their sense to the corresponding fragments of sentences containing ‘quasi-indexicals’(‘then’, for example, is the quasi-indexical to ‘now’ as indexical). Someone uttering (1) assertively will thereby make a proposition like (2) true. (2) entails (3) ‘CJFW said in Oxford on 23 September 1993 that CJFW was in Oxford on 23 September 1991′. So by uttering (1) in the appropriate circumstances I made it true that I had asserted the proposition (4) ‘CJFW was in Oxford on 23 September 1991′. What is analytic and necessarily true is the proposition ‘If (3) then (4)’.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    The @classical quarterly 32 (1982), S. 304-306 
    ISSN: 0009-8388
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Classical Studies
    Notes: At Theaetetus 163d-164b Socrates objects to the thesis that knowledge is perception by pointing out that a man who has seen something can still remember it, and so has knowledge of it; but this is impossible, if knowledge is perception, since he is no longer perceiving it.To this Protagoras is made to reply with two sentences at 166b 1–4:[...] [...].Cornford translates ‘ For instance, do you think you will find anyone to admit that one's present memory of a past impression is an impression of the same character as one had during the original experience, which is now over? It is nothing of the sort’.Cornford understands this as the suggestion that the memory and the original perception are of different things: ‘ All that the objection in fact established was that “ perception” must be stretched to include awareness of memory images’. So too Lee: ‘Protagoras’ “way out”... appears to be to say that what we now know is not properly X but rather (say) our memory trace of X - some present πά θ ο ς (Y) quite distinct from X (or, more exactly, from our earlier perception of X: Protagoras must thoroughly subjectivize the matter) and very different from that (perhaps along Humean lines of vividness and the like)’. (Relevant passages from Hume are given by Campbell in his note ad loc.) McDowel
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Philosophy 69 (1994), S. 365-368 
    ISSN: 0031-8191
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Philosophy
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Philosophy 63 (1988), S. 536-537 
    ISSN: 0031-8191
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Philosophy
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Religious studies 16 (1980), S. 493-495 
    ISSN: 0034-4125
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Theology and Religious Studies
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Religious studies 1 (1966), S. 203-215 
    ISSN: 0034-4125
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Theology and Religious Studies
    Notes: (5) ἆρ' [...] ∈ἰ kaì ⋯γ ∈´νητον (282 a 25) ... πρòς τò ɸθαρτόν, ⋯ϕ' ᾧΘ (283 a 3). Aristotle claims so far to have proved that the eternal is incorruptible and that it is ungenerated. He has still to prove the converse of each of these propositions, namely, that whatever is incorruptible is eternal and that whatever is ungenerated is eternal also. After putting the thesis in question form he gives a further definition of ⋯γ∈´νητος and ἄɸθαρτος in the parenthesis of 282 a 27–30. Unfortunately in both cases he uses the assertoric form of the definiens, although in chapter 11 he had used a modal form in the relevant passages (cf. kυρίως 280 b 32 and 282 a 27); but this confusion does not seem to affect the immediate trend of the argument. He then (282 a 30—b 1) shows that his thesis follows necessarily from the convertibility of ⋯γ∈´νητος and ἄɸθαρτος. The additional premiss that is necessary in order to secure this inference, namely, that that which is both ungenerated and incorruptible is eternal, is clear from the definition of the terms. It is also clear from the convertibility of ɸθαρτóς and γ∈ νητóς, which itself is entailed by the supposed convertibility of their contradictories. This last inference seems too trivial to deserve a mention, but Aristotle devotes 282 b 2–5 to proving it. Then, having demonstrated to his satisfaction that the convertibility of ἄɸθαρτος and ⋯γ∈´νητος necessarily implies the eternity of both the incorruptible and the ungenerated, he adds, for good measure, that if the terms are not convertible the implication is no longer necessary (282 b 5–7).
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Religious studies 1 (1965), S. 95-107 
    ISSN: 0034-4125
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Theology and Religious Studies
    Notes: In a discussion-note in Mind (July 1958), Father P. M. Farrell, O.P., gave an account, in what he admitted to be an embarrassingly brief compass, of the Thomist doctrine concerning evil. There is one sentence in this discussion which at first glance appears paradoxical. Father Farrell has been arguing that a universe containing ‘corruptible good’ as well as incorruptible is better than one containing ‘incorruptible good’ only. He continues: ‘If, however, they are to manifest this corruptible good, they must be corruptible and they must sometimes corrupt.’ The final words, despite Father Farrell's italics, strike one as expressing, not a self-evident truth, but a non sequitur. The fact that I am capable of committing murder does not entail that I will at some time commit it. It is not immediately obvious that a similar entailment holds in the case of corruption and corruptibility.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Religious studies 3 (1968), S. 513-524 
    ISSN: 0034-4125
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Theology and Religious Studies
    Notes: Christology seems to fall fairly clearly into two divisions. The first is concerned with the truth of the two propositions: ‘Christ is God’ and ‘Christ is a man’. The second is concerned with the mutual compatibility of these propositions. The first part of Christology tends to confine itself to what is sometimes called ‘positive theology’: that is to say, it is largely given over to examining the Jons revelationis—let us not prejudge currently burning issues by asking what this is—to see what evidence can be found for the truth of these propositions. Clearly, the methods used will be above all those of New Testament exegesis. The second part of Christology will necessarily consist entirely of that speculative theology which is contrasted with positive theology. Even if the earliest speculation on this topic is to be found in the New Testament itself and thus becomes fair game for the exegetes, any attempt to relate the primary truths, ‘Christ is God’ and ‘Christ is a man’, to eachother is a work of reflection, and in the terminology I am using speculative.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    New blackfriars 52 (1971), S. 0 
    ISSN: 1741-2005
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Theology and Religious Studies
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    The @classical review 22 (1972), S. 301-303 
    ISSN: 0009-840X
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Classical Studies
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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