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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Journal of mathematical biology 34 (1996), S. 253-270 
    ISSN: 1432-1416
    Keywords: ESS ; Game theory ; Contest behavior ; Kin selection
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Mathematics
    Notes: Abstract Evolutionarily stable strategies or ESSs of games among kin have been calculated in the literature by both “personal-fitness” and “inclusive-fitness” methods. These methods were compared by Hines and Maynard Smith (1979) for games with bilinear payoffs. Although Hines and Maynard Smith regarded the first method as correct, they regarded the second method as useful because the inclusive-fitness conditions for an ESS gave necessary conditions for a personal-fitness ESS in the class of games they considered. In general, however, satisfying the inclusive-fitness conditions is neither necessary nor sufficient for satisfying the personal-fitness conditions, although the two methods may often yield identical ESSs. This result is established by reformulating the classic war-of-attrition model to allow variation in energy reserves, assumed to have a Gamma distribution. For this game, the two methods may disagree for intermediate values of relatedness. By the correct method, if the coefficient of variation in energy reserves is sufficiently high, then the game has a unique ESS in pure strategies at which populations with higher coefficients of variation or relatedness display for shorter times. Unrelated contestants are prepared to expend at least half of their reserves. For populations with lower variation coefficients, the ESS exists only if the cost of displaying per unit time is low compared to the rate at which remaining reserves translate into expected future reproductive success for the victor. The critical variation coefficient, below which the ESS exists regardless of cost, decreases from 0.52 to 0 as the coefficient of relatedness increases from 0 to 1. Although there is no assessment, contests are always won by the animal with greater energy reserves in a population at the ESS.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    [s.l.] : Macmillan Magazines Ltd.
    Nature 402.1999, 6761supp, C81-, (4 S.) 
    ISSN: 1476-4687
    Source: Nature Archives 1869 - 2009
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
    Notes: [Auszug] Modern science has until recently flourished partly because of a stable, underlying agreement between its practitioners and the rest of society. In other words, there has been a social contract between science and society, an arrangement built on trust which sets out the expectations of the one ...
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    R & D management 16 (1986), S. 0 
    ISSN: 1467-9310
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper describes the results of a case-study carried out within the context of a wider evaluation of the benefits and costs of international collaboration in Europe for the development of fast breeder reactors. The Cabri reactor is a large scale research facility jointly owned and operated by France and Germany, with the UK, USA, and Japan involved as junior partners. The organisation of the collaboration is discussed. Particular issues include problems surrounding barter arrange- ments, personnel aspects and the extent to which costs and benefits have been incurred. It is concluded that a substantial saving was achieved compared with performing the work in one country, but at a cost of reduced national control. The collaboration was facilitated by the lack of immediate commercial significance and by the organisational structure.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Bulletin of mathematical biology 56 (1994), S. 999-1008 
    ISSN: 1522-9602
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Mathematics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Bulletin of mathematical biology 54 (1992), S. 423-443 
    ISSN: 1522-9602
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Mathematics
    Notes: Abstract Two standard assumptions in analytical work on the iterated prisoner's dilemma are that the population is infinite, and that opponents—though randomly selected—are fixed for the duration of the game. This paper explores the consequences of relaxing both assumptions. It is shown in particular that if opponents are drawn at random throughout the game, then stable cooperation via reciprocity requires both that the probability of a further interaction be sufficiently high—higher than when opponents are fixed—and that the population not exceed a certain critical size, which depends on the probability of further interaction.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Empirica 21 (1994), S. 257-258 
    ISSN: 1573-6911
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Empirica 21 (1994), S. 259-270 
    ISSN: 1573-6911
    Keywords: Science ; technology ; knowledge ; production ; policy ; transfer sciences ; L52 ; O32
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper is concerned to develop the notion of transfer science to take account of what is perceived to be the emergence of a new mode of knowledge production. The new mode which is characterised by the production of knowledge in the context of application, by transdisciplinarity, by homogeneity and organisational diversity, by enhanced social accountability and reflexivity, and by new forms of quality control. The thrust of the new mode of knowledge production is to call into question conventional notions of knowledge transfer and focuses instead on the organisational and managerial implications of the emergence of a socially distributed knowledge production system. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the policy implications of the emergence of the new mode of production. Needed in the new mode are science and technology policies which promote institutional permeability and policies which enable governments, acting through their civil service to act as “brokers” in the new knowledge production process. Such brokerage is necessary to enhance permeability between institutions within a particular country but also to increase co-operation and collaboration between institutions across countries.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Journal of mathematical biology 39 (1999), S. 91-108 
    ISSN: 1432-1416
    Keywords: Key words: Evolutionarily stable strategies ; Game theory ; Sperm competition
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Mathematics
    Notes: Abstract.  In principle there are two approaches to modelling a trade-off between the positive and negative outcomes of a behavior: after suitably defining a value for the behavior in the absence of any trade-off, one can either multiply that value by an appropriate discount or subtract an appropriate cost. In a prospective analysis of sperm competition, Parker (Proc. Roy. Soc. Lond. B (1990) 242, 120–126) adopted the multiplicative approach to model the trade-off between the value of a mating and the cost of its acquisition. He obtained two paradoxical results. First, if two males ‘know’ whether they are first or second to mate, but these roles are assigned randomly, then sperm numbers should be the same for both males whether the ‘raffle’ for fertilization is fair or unfair. Second, if mating order is constant, then a favored male should expend less on sperm. His results are puzzling not only in terms of intuition about nature, but also in terms of his model’s consistency. In other words, they present both an external and an internal paradox. Parker assumed the fairness of the raffle to a disfavored male to be independent of how much sperm a favored male deposits. This article both generalizes Parker’s analysis by allowing fairness to decrease with sperm expenditure by the favored male and compares Parker’s results to those obtained by the additive approach. In many respects, results are similar. Nevertheless, if the costs of mating are assumed to increase with sperm expenditure but not to depend on the role in which sperm is expended, as Parker assumed, then the additive approach is more fundamentally correct. In particular, Parker’s constant-role paradox is an artifact of his approach. His random-role paradox is internally rationalized in terms of standard microeconomic theory. When fairness decreases, however slightly, with sperm expenditure by the favored male, both models demonstrate that the evolutionarily stable strategy is for more sperm to be deposited during a favored mating than during a disfavored mating. The lower the costs, the greater the divergence. Thus a possible resolution of the external paradox is that fairness is not constant in nature.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Journal of mathematical biology 34 (1996), S. 253-270 
    ISSN: 1432-1416
    Keywords: Key words: ESS ; Game theory ; Contest behavior ; Kin selection
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Mathematics
    Notes: Abstract.  Evolutionarily stable strategies or ESSs of games among kin have been calculated in the literature by both “personal-fitness” and “inclusive-fitness” methods. These methods were compared by Hines and Maynard Smith (1979) for games with bilinear payoffs. Although Hines and Maynard Smith regarded the first method as correct, they regarded the second method as useful because the inclusive-fitness conditions for an ESS gave necessary conditions for a personal-fitness ESS in the class of games they considered. In general, however, satisfying the inclusive-fitness conditions is neither necessary nor sufficient for satisfying the personal-fitness conditions, although the two methods may often yield identical ESSs. This result is established by reformulating the classic war-of-attrition model to allow variation in energy reserves, assumed to have a Gamma distribution. For this game, the two methods may disagree for intermediate values of relatedness. By the correct method, if the coefficient of variation in energy reserves is sufficiently high, then the game has a unique ESS in pure strategies at which populations with higher coefficients of variation or relatedness display for shorter times. Unrelated contestants are prepared to expend at least half of their reserves. For populations with lower variation coefficients, the ESS exists only if the cost of displaying per unit time is low compared to the rate at which remaining reserves translate into expected future reproductive success for the victor. The critical variation coefficient, below which the ESS exists regardless of cost, decreases from 0.52 to 0 as the coefficient of relatedness increases from 0 to 1. Although there is no assessment, contests are always won by the animal with greater energy reserves in a population at the ESS.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Bulletin of mathematical biology 58 (1996), S. 861-875 
    ISSN: 1522-9602
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Mathematics
    Notes: Abstract Previous game-theoretic models of reciprocity have assumed that populations are large and organisms effectively sessile. This paper analyzes an iterated prisoner's dilemma among non-sessile organisms in a finite population, on the assumption that an individual's chance of remaining in one place is not influenced by a partner's behavior. This mode of interaction is suitable for analyzing potentially cooperative behaviors that are secondary to the advantage of group formation, e.g. allogrooming among social mammals. The analysis yields necessary conditions for stable reciprocity in terms of three parameters, namely, a benefit/cost ratio, the probability of further interaction and the probability of partner retention. The results suggest that, in highly mobile organisms such as fish, birds and mammals, reciprocity may be stable only if the population is small and the relative benefit and future interaction probability are both large.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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