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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    A general-equilibrium intertemporal model of an open economy (1992)
    Springer
    Economic theory 2 (1992), S. 215-246 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary This paper develops a very general (general-equilibrium) intertemporal model of a country engaged in international trade which can be used to address a wide variety of issues of interest — in particular, econometric application — under the assumption that prices of tradable commodities (consumer goods and capital goods) and the interest rate are exogenous to the country. It allows for an arbitrarily large number of commodities which are distinguished into seven categories and for finite or infinite periods of time. This model can be used to draw various policy conclusions. We investigate how current net imports, the balance of payments on current account, current consumption expenditure, next-period bondholdings, current wealth, and current internal prices will react to exogenous changes in current external prices, the current interest rate, current taxes, current factor endowments, and current-period bondholdings. This paper also considers the integrability of net-import demand functions.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01211441
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Double implementation in economies with production technologies unknown to the designer (1999)
    Springer
    Economic theory 13 (1999), S. 689-707 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: Keywords and Phrases: Double implementation Walrasian allocations ; Lindahl allocations ; Unkown production technologies. ; JEL Classification Numbers: C72 ; D51 ; D71 ; H41.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. This paper considers double implementation of Walrasian allocations and Lindahl allocations in Nash and strong Nash equilibria for both private and public goods economies when preferences, initial endowments, production technologies, and coalition patterns are all unknown to the designer. It will be noted that the mechanisms presented here are feasible and continuous. In addition, unlike most mechanisms proposed in the literature, our mechanism works not only for three or more agents, but also for two-agent economies, and thus it is a unified mechanism which is irrespective of the number of agents.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050276
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Double implementation of Lindahl allocations by a pure mechanism (2000)
    Springer
    Social choice and welfare 17 (2000), S. 125-141 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-217X
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract. This paper considers the issue of designing mechanisms whose Nash allocations and strong Nash allocations coincide with Lindahl allocations for public goods economies when coalition patterns, preferences, and endowments are unknown to the designer. It will be noted that the mechanism presented here is feasible and continuous, and the implementation result is obtained without defining an artificial preference profile on prices announced by individuals. In addition, unlike most existing Nash-implementing mechanisms which need to distinguish the case of two agents from that of three or more agents, this paper provides a unified mechanism which is irrespective of the number of agents.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/PL00007170
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence without continuous, convex, and ordered preferences (1992)
    Springer
    Social choice and welfare 9 (1992), S. 117-130 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-217X
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper consideres the problem of designing “better” mechanisms whose Nash allocations coincide with constrained Walrasian allocations for non-neoclassical economies under the minimal possible assumptions. We show that no assumprions on preferences are needed for feasible and continuous implementation of the constrained Walraisan correspondence. Further, under the monotonicity assumption, we present a mechanism that is completely feasible and continuous. Hence, no continuity and convexity assumptions on preferences are required, and preferences may be nontotal or nontransitive. Thus, this paper gives a somewhat positive answer to the question raised in the literature by showing that, even for non-neoclassical economies, there are “incentive-compatible”, “privacy preserving”, and “well-behaved” mechanisms which yield Pareto-efficient and individually rational allocations at Nash equilibria.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00187237
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Bayesian implementation in exchange economies with state dependent preferences and feasible sets (1999)
    Springer
    Social choice and welfare 16 (1999), S. 99-119 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-217X
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract. This paper considers Bayesian and Nash implementation in exchange economic environments with state dependent preferences and feasible sets. We fully characterize Bayesian implementability for both diffuse and non-diffuse information structures. We show that, in exchange economic environments with three or more individuals, a social choice set is Bayesian implementable if and only if closure, non-confiscatority, Bayesian monotonicity, and Bayesian incentive compatibility are satisfied. As such, it improves upon and contains as special cases previously known results about Nash and Bayesian implementation in exchange economic environments. We show that the individual rationality and continuity conditions, imposed in Hurwicz et al. [12], can be weakened to the non-confiscatority and can be dropped, respectively, for Nash implementation. Thus we also give a full characterization for Nash implementation when endowments and preferences are both unknown to the designer.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550050133
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    A characterization of the existenceof optimal dominant strategy mechanisms (1999)
    Springer
    Review of economic design 4 (1999), S. 205-218 
    Details
    ISSN: 1434-4750
    Keywords: JEL classification:C72, D71, D82, H41 ; Key words:Groves mechanisms, dominant strategy implementation
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract. This paper provides two theorems which characterize the domains of valuation functions for which there exist Pareto efficient and truth dominant strategy mechanisms (balanced Groves mechanisms). Theorem 1 characterizes the existence of balanced Groves mechanisms for a general class of valuation functions. Theorem 2 provides new balance-permitting domains of valuation functions by reducing the problem of solving partial differential equations to the problem of solving a polynomial function. It shows that a balanced Groves mechanism exists if and only if each valuation function in the family under consideration can be obtained by solving a polynomial function with order less than $n-1$ , where n is the number of individuals.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s100580050034
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Minimax inequalities equivalent to the Fan-Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz theorems (1993)
    Springer
    Applied mathematics & optimization 28 (1993), S. 173-179 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0606
    Keywords: The minimax inequality ; Variational inequalities ; The FKKM theorem ; Noncompact and nonconvex sets ; Equivalence ; 49A29 ; 90C33 ; 90C50
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics
    Notes: Abstract The purpose of this note is to give further generalizations of the Ky Fan minimax inequality by relaxing the compactness and convexity of sets and the quasi-concavity of the functional and to show that our minimax inequalities are equivalent to the Fan-Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz (FKKM) theorem and a modified FKKM theorem given in this note.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01182980
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