ISSN:
1432-0479
Schlagwort(e):
Keywords and Phrases: Voting
;
Central limit theorem
;
Paradoxes.
;
JEL Classification Numbers: D71
;
D72.
Quelle:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Thema:
Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Notizen:
Summary. A disturbing phenomenon in voting, which causes most of the problems as well as the interest in the field, is that election outcomes (for fixed preferences) can change with the way the ballots are tallied. This causes difficulties because with each possible choice, some set of voters can be dubious about whether it is the “correct” one. But, how likely are these settings allowing multiple election outcomes? By combining properties of the geometry of voting developed by Saari with a analytic-geometric technique created by Schlafli, we determine the likelihood that a three candidate election can cause these potentially dubious outcomes.
Materialart:
Digitale Medien
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050258
Permalink