Abstract
The object of this paper is to demonstrate in economic terms the equivalence of the problem of aggregation in input-output analysis with coalition and bargaining problems. Depending on the specific norm for aggregation it is shown that the aggregation criterion and the coalition forming criterion in an n-person game leads to a broadly similar situation in the market sense given that the market operates to that criterion. It is also shown that a mathematical analogue to this formulation may be obtained via the techniques of geometric programming.
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References
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R.J. Duffin, E.L. Peterson, C. Zenner (1967), Geometric Programming, Wiley.
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Ghosh, A. A formulation of the aggregation problem in terms of coalition and bargaining theory. Econ Plann 23, 97–116 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00312929
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00312929