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Representation of characteristic function games by social choice functions

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Abstract

In Peleg's investigation of the representation of a simple game by a social choice function, it is shown that a special kind of proper symmetric simple game has its representation by employing the elimination procedure. In this paper, we consider a representation of a characteristic function game and explore general conditions under which the elimination procedure works effectively.

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References

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Systems Science, Tokyo Institute of Technology, 2-12-1 Oh-Okayama, Meguro-Ku, 152, Tokyo, Japan

    S. Ishikawa

  2. Dept. of Humanities and Social Sciences, Tokyo Institute of Technology, 2-12-1 Oh-Okayama, Meguro-Ku, 152, Tokyo, Japan

    K. Nakamura

Authors
  1. S. Ishikawa
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  2. K. Nakamura
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Additional information

ProfessorKenjiro Nakamura died on October 27, 1979 at the age of 32.

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Ishikawa, S., Nakamura, K. Representation of characteristic function games by social choice functions. Int J Game Theory 9, 191–199 (1980). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01771425

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01771425

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