REFERENCES
Blackburn, S. (1981): 'Reply: Rule-Following and Moral Realism', in S. Holtzman and C. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule, London: Routledge, pp. 163-187.
Blackburn, S. (1993): 'Realism, Quasi, or Queasy?' in J. Haldane and C. Wright (eds.), Reality, Representation, and Projection, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 365-384.
Brandom, R. (1988): 'Inference, Expression and Induction: Some Sellarsian Themes', Philosophical Studies 54, 257-285.
Churchland, P. (1970): 'The Logical Character of Action Explanations', Philosophical Review 79, 214-236.
Davidson, D. (1990): Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Clarendon.
Fodor, J. (1974): 'Special Sciences', Synthese 28, pp. 77-115.
Hacking, I. (1990): The Taming of Chance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Heil, J. (1992): The Nature of True Minds, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hempel, C. (1965): 'The Theoretician's Dilemma', in Aspects of Scientific Explanation, New York: Basic Books, pp. 173-228.
Kitcher, P. (1984): '1953 And All That: A Tale of Two Sciences', Philosophical Review 93, 335-373.
Kuhn, T. (1970): The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed., Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lange, M. (1993): 'Natural Laws and the Problem of Provisos', Erkenntnis 38, 233-248.
Lange, M. (1995): 'Are There Natural Laws concerning Particular Biological Species?', Journal of Philosophy 92, 430-451.
Lange, M. (1996): 'Laws of Nature, Cosmic Coincidences, and Scientific Realism', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74, 614-638.
Lange, M. (1999): 'Why Are the Laws of Nature so Important to Science?', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59, 625-52.
Lange, M. (2000): Natural Laws in Scientific Practice, New York: Oxford University Press.
Loeb, L. (1934): The Kinetic Theory of Gases, New York: McGraw-Hill.
McDowell, J. (1978): 'Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society supplementary volume 52, pp. 13-29.
McDowell, J. (1979): 'Virtue and Reason', The Monist 62, 331-350.
McDowell, J. (1981): 'Non-Cognitivismand Rule-Following', in S. Holtzman and C. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule, London: Routledge, pp. 141-162.
McDowell, J. (1985): 'Values and Secondary Qualities', in T. Honderich (ed.), Value and Objectivity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 110-129.
McDowell, J. (1987): 'Projection and Truth in Ethics', The Lindley Lecture, University of Kansas.
Mill, J.S. (1893): A System of Logic, 8th ed., New York: Harper and Bros.
Millikan, R.G. (1993): 'Explanation in Biopsychology', in J. Heil and A. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation, Oxford: Clarendon, pp. 211-232.
Putnam, H. (1975): Mind, Language, and Reality, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Schiffer, S. (1991): 'Ceteris Paribus Laws', Mind 100, 1-17.
Sellars, W. (1963a): 'Phenomenalism', in Science, Perception and Reality, London: Routledge, pp. 60-95.
Sellars, W. (1963b): 'The Language of Theories', in Ibid, pp. 106-126.
Sellars, W. (1963c): 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind', in Ibid., pp. 127-196.
Sellars, W. (1965): 'Scientific Realism or Irenic Instrumentalism', in R. Cohen and M. Wartofsky (eds.), Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, v.2, New York: Humanities Press, pp. 171-204.
Sellars, W. (1977): 'Is Scientific Realism Tenable?' in PSA 1976 v.2, Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 307-334.
Teller, P. (1984): 'Comments on Kim's Paper', Southern Journal of Philosophy 22supp. vol., pp. 57-61.
Wiggins, D. (1987): Needs, Values, Truth, Oxford: Blackwell.
van Fraassen, B. (1977): 'On the Radical Incompleteness of the Manifest Image', in PSA 1976 v.2, Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 335-343.
van Fraassen, B. (1980): The Scientific Image, Oxford: Clarendon.
van Fraassen, B. (1989): Laws and Symmetry, Oxford: Clarendon.
van Spronsen J.W. (1969): The Periodic System of Chemical Elements, Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Lange, M. Salience, Supervenience, and Layer Cakes in Sellars's Scientific Realism, McDowell's Moral Realism, and the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophical Studies 101, 213–251 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026445113223
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026445113223