Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

INDUCTIVE CONFIRMATION, COUNTERFACTUAL CONDITIONALS, AND LAWS OF NATURE

  • Published:
Philosophical Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

REFERENCES

  • Adams, Ernest (1976) ‘Prior Probabilities and Counterfactual Conditionals’, in W. Harper and C. Hooker, eds., Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories of Science, vol. 1 (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1976), 1-21.

  • Armstrong, David (1983) What Is a Law of Nature? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

  • Bennett, Jonathan (1984) ‘Counterfactuals and Temporal Direction’, Philosophical Review 43, 57-91.

    Google Scholar 

  • Black, Max (1967) ‘Induction’, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 4, ed. P. Edwards (New York: Macmillan), 169-181.

  • Braithwaite, R.B. (1927) ‘The Idea of Necessary Connexion (I)’, Mind 36: 467- 477.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carnap, Rudolf (1950) Logical Foundations of Probability (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).

  • Chisholm, Roderick (1955) ‘Law Statements and Counterfactual Inference’, Analysis 15: 97-105.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dretske, Fred (1977) ‘Laws of Nature’, Philosophy of Science 44: 248-268. phil6724.tex; 4/02/1997; 1:02; v.4; p.34

    Google Scholar 

  • Feigl, Herbert (1961) ‘On the Vindication of Induction’, Philosophy of Science 28: 212-216.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goodman, Nelson (1983) Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, 4th ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).

  • Hempel, C.G. (1965) Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: The Free Press).

  • Horwich, Paul (1987) Asymmetries in Time (Cambridge: MIT Press).

  • Jackson, Frank (1977) ‘A Causal Theory of Counterfactuals’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55: 3-21.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kneale, William (1950) ‘Natural Laws and Contrary-to-Fact Conditionals’, Analysis 10: 121-125.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kneale, William (1952) Probability and Induction (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

  • Lange, Marc (1993a) ‘Lawlikeness’, Nous 27: 1-21.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lange, Marc (1993b) “When Would Natural Laws Have Been Broken”, Analysis 53: 262-269.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lange, Marc (1994) ‘Earman on the Projectibility of Grue’, in D. Hull, M. Forbes, and R.M. Burian, eds., PSA 1994, vol. 1 (East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association), 87-95.

  • Lange, Marc (1995), ‘Are There Natural Laws Concerning Particular Biological Species?’, The Journal of Philosophy 92: 430-451.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lange, Marc (forthcoming), Laws of Nature.

  • Lewis, David (1973) Counterfactuals (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).

  • Lewis, David (1986) ‘Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow’, in his Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 32-51.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mackie, J.L. (1962) ‘Counterfactuals and Causal Laws’, Analytic Philosophy, ed. Butler (New York: Barnes and Noble), 66-80.

  • Moore, G.E. (1962)Common-Place Book 1919-1953, ed. C. Lewy (London: Allen & Unwin).

  • Newton, Isaac (1971) Sir Isaac Newton's Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy and His System of the World, vol. 2, trans. Motte, rev. Cajori, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press).

  • Pap, Arthur (1958) ‘Disposition Concepts and Extensional Logic’, in H. Feigl and M. Scriven, eds., Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 2 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 196-224.

  • Peirce, C.S. (1934) Collected Papers, vol. 5, ed. C. Hortshorne and P. Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).

  • Pollock, John (1976) Subjunctive Reasoning (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel).

  • Popper, Karl (1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Basic Books).

  • Reichenbach, Hans (1947) Elements of Symbolic Logic (New York: Macmillan).

  • Scheffler, Israel (1981) The Anatomy of Inquiry (Indianapolis: Hackett).

  • Skyrms, Brian (1980) ‘The Prior Propensity Account of Subjunctive Conditionals’, inW. Harper, R. Stalnaker, and G. Pearce, eds., Ifs(Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel), 259-266.

    Google Scholar 

  • Slote, Michael (1978) ‘Time in Counterfactuals’, Philosophical Review 87: 3-27.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sober, Elliott (1988) ‘Confirmation and Law-Likeness’, Philosophical Review 97: 93-98.

    Google Scholar 

  • Strawson, P.F. (1952) Introduction to Logical Theory (London: Methuen). phil6724.tex; 4/02/1997; 1:02; v.4; p.35

  • van Fraassen, Bas (1983) ‘Theory Confirmation: Tension and Conflict’, in P.

  • Weingartner and M. Czermak, eds., Epistemology and Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the Seventh International Wittgenstein Symposium (Vienna: Hoelder-Pichler-Tempsky), 319-329.

  • van Fraassen, Bas (1989) Laws and Symmetry (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of California, Los Angeles, CA, 90095-1451, USA

    Marc Lange

Authors
  1. Marc Lange
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Lange, M. INDUCTIVE CONFIRMATION, COUNTERFACTUAL CONDITIONALS, AND LAWS OF NATURE. Philosophical Studies 85, 1–36 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1017926103678

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1017926103678

Keywords

Search

Navigation