Abstract
In this note we consider the core of a game with side payments representing simple majority voting. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the game to have a nonempty core.
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Kaneko, M. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a nonempty core of a majority game. Int J Game Theory 4, 215–219 (1975). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01769268
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01769268