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Logrolling and a McGarvey theorem for separable tournaments

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Abstract

In this note we prove a McGarvey theorem for the family of Separable Tournaments. This family arises in the analysis of Logrolling and Vote Trading in Committees.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Greqam, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Centre de la Vieille Charité, 2 Rue de la Charité, 13002, Marseille, France

    Guillaume Hollard

  2. Greqam, Universitéd'Aix-Marseille 2, Institut Universitaire de France Chateau Lafarge, Route des Milles, 13290, Les Milles, France

    Michel Le Breton

Authors
  1. Guillaume Hollard
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  2. Michel Le Breton
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Additional information

The authors would like to thank N.R. Miller for sending us Miller (1994), E. Hopkins and F. Mouton for useful comments on early versions of the manuscript, and two anonymous referees for detailed reports.

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Hollard, G., Le Breton, M. Logrolling and a McGarvey theorem for separable tournaments. Soc Choice Welfare 13, 451–455 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00182855

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00182855

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