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Negishi, T., Holler, M.J., van Damme, E. et al. Book reviews. Journal of Economics Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie 48, 198–222 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01234611
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01234611