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Negotiating the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

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Extract

The negotiations leading to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), both in their political and psychological contexts, are an interesting and indeed unique episode in post World War II diplomatic history. The most significant feature of the negotiations was that they succeeded. The Soviet Union and the United States reached a measure of agreement in the vital field of atomic energy. Virtually the entire world joined enthusiastically in this agreement. An international organization came into being with vast potential—even though today in a changed political atmosphere doubts exist that the potential will ever be realized.

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Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1959

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References

1 The following official United States Government Records describe the chief stages of negotiations:

1. Address by President Eisenhower to the United Nations—December 3, 1953, Atoms for Peace Manual, 84th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Document No. 55, p. 1.

2. Soviet U. S. Bilateral Exchanges, Atoms for Peace Manual, p. 262–284 (through September 1954), Department of State Press Release No. 527, October 6, 1956 (Remainder).

3. UN General Assembly Discussions 1954, Report by the President to tie Congress, State Department Publication No. 5769, p. 16–24.

4. 8–State Negotiations, Report of Hon. Morehead Patterson, Department of State Bulletin, 01 2, 1956 (Vol. 34, No. 862), p. 47Google Scholar.

5. General Assembly Discussions 1955, Report by the President to the Congress, State Department Publication No. 6318, p. 28–41.

6. 12–State Working Level Meeting, Report of the Working Level Meeting, State Department Document 31, Washington, D. C, July 2, 1956.

7. Conference on Statute of IAEA, Report of Ambassador Wadsworth (not published). This Report was submitted to the Secretary of State early in 1957 in the midst of a venal campaign by a small group aimed to prevent ratification of the Statute by the United States Senate. The Report gave full credit to the role of many states in creating the Statute. This might have furnished ammunition to those who were conducting the campaign of vilification. It is possible that this may account for the failure to publish the Report.

2 Hearing before Committee on Foreign Relations of Senate on Statute, May 14, 1953, 85th Congress, 1st. Session, p. 93.

3 Address by President Eisenhower to the United Nations—December 3, 1953, Atoms for Peace Manual, 84th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Document No. 55, P. 5.

4 Ibid., p. 6.

6 Ibid., p. 5.

7 This is a paraphrase of an oral statement actually made by a representative of a friendly state during the negotiations. The identity of the speaker or of his country should not be disclosed. Several states held the same view without expressing it so bluntly.

8 Address by President Eisenhower, p. 6.

9 For example, statement of Ambassador Wadsworth, Hearings before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 16, p. 128.

10 General Assembly Resolution 715 (VIII), November 28, 1953.

11 Address by President Eisenhower, p. 5.

12 The initial exchanges between the Soviet Union and the United States concerning an international agency consisted of 13 documents, the first dated January 11, 1954, and the last dated September 23, 1954.

13 This variance should not be given too great significance because of the tentative and sketchy nature of these proposals. The change may have reflected the views of some of the states which the United States was consulting.

14 Statement of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Press Release by James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to the President, August 30, 1954. Atoms for Peace Manual, 84th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Document No. 55, p. 252.

15 See above, footnote 10.

16 Atoms for Peace Manual, 84th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Document No. 55, p. 292–303.

17 General Assembly Official Records (9th session), First Committee, 715th Meeting, November 12, 1954, P. 353.

18 Ibid., 717th Meeting, November 15, 1954, p. 34.

19 Atoms for Peace Manual, p. 291, 292.

20 Report of Ambassador Patterson to the President, Department of State Bulletin, 01 2, 1956 (Vol. 34, No. 862), p. 6Google Scholar.

21 Ibid., p. 5.

23 See Stein, Bechhoefer &, “Atoms for Peace, the New IAEA,” Michigan Law Review (Vol. 55), p. 747 at 761Google Scholar.

24 Oral statement of Ambassador Eban at State Department on June 3, 1955.

25 General Assembly Resolution 912 (X), December 3, 1955.

26 Note from Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs to American Embassy, October 1, 1955. State Department Press Release No. 527, October 6, 1956, p. 22–24.

27 At all stages of the negotiations suggestions were advanced that IAEA should be a specialized agency of the UN. As the negotiations proceeded from generalities to specifics, it became apparent that in important respects, the relationships between the UN and IAEA must differ materially from the usual patterns established for the specialized agencies.

1. IAEA obviously must have a direct relationship with the Security Council because of the close relationship of its work to the entire problem of disarmament and international security.

2. India and other countries stressed the necessity of direct reporting from IAEA to the General Assembly without the intermediate step of reporting to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Noting these differences, the UN Secretariat at one point suggested that the agency become an integral part of the UN itself, operated directly by the UN Secretariat.

Article III of the Statute provides for annual reports by IAEA to the General Assembly and reports as appropriate to other UN organs, mentioning the Security Council and ECOSOC. The relationship agreement between the UN and IAEA results in IAEA being somewhat less an autonomous body than at least two specialized agencies, the International Bank and the International Monetary Fund. On matters of concern t o ECOSOC, the IAEA-UN relationship follows exactly the specialized agency pattern.

It is suggested that the existing pattern of relationships is logical and indeed was inevitable.

28 For full discussion both of the issues placed before the Conference and the solution, see Bechhoefer, and Stein, , op. cit., p. 747Google Scholar, at p. 765, and p. 795 and 796.