Dynamic optimal income taxation with government commitment☆
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Adverse selection, commitment and exhaustible resource taxation
2020, Resource and Energy EconomicsCitation Excerpt :For instance, in the Turkish Petroleum Code, Article 65, specifies that a license is to be granted for twenty years with a possibility of two extensions for no more than ten years each if certain conditions have been met.2 The inability to commit to long-term contracts has major effects on optimal taxation schemes (Farhi et al., 2012; Brito et al., 1991 or Dillen and Lundholm, 1996) especially with private information. Indeed, without commitment, if a regulated firm has private information, the regulator updates its belief at the end of each contract.
Dynamic nonlinear income taxation with quasi-hyperbolic discounting and no commitment
2015, Journal of Economic Behavior and OrganizationPareto efficient income taxation with stochastic abilities
2008, Journal of Public EconomicsIncome taxation with intergenerational mobility: Can higher inequality lead to less progression?
2005, European Economic ReviewSocial security, retirement age and optimal income taxation
2004, Journal of Public EconomicsCitation Excerpt :On the health issue, there are naturally the papers by Diamond and Mirrlees (1978, 1986), which demonstrate the analytical difficulty of the question at hand. On the productivity issues, Britto et al. (1991) have shown how difficult is the issue of optimal non-linear income tax in a multiperiod setting. In view of these difficulties, it should not be surprising that the design an optimal tax-transfer scheme with intensive and extensive labor supply choices in a dynamic setting and with two characteristics is a formidable task.
New perspectives on public finance: Recent achievements and future challenges
2002, Journal of Public Economics
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The authors thank David Sappington and two anonymous referees for valuable comments. Jonathan Hamilton thanks the Public Policy Research Center for financial support. Joseph Stiglitz thanks the Hoover Institution, the John M. Olin Foundation, and the National Science Foundation for financial support.