Dynamic optimal income taxation with government commitment

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Abstract

We analyze the optimal income tax problem when consumers work for many periods. Can information about abilities learned in one period be used later to attain more redistribution than is possible in a one-period world? When the government can commit to future policies and has the same discount rate as individuals, intertemporal nonstationarity of tax schedules can lead to Pareto improvements by relaxing lifetime self-selection constraints, analogous to randomization in a one-period world. More significant use of information is possible when the social discount rate is less than individuals' rates. The taxes converge over time to a nondistortionary schedule.

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The authors thank David Sappington and two anonymous referees for valuable comments. Jonathan Hamilton thanks the Public Policy Research Center for financial support. Joseph Stiglitz thanks the Hoover Institution, the John M. Olin Foundation, and the National Science Foundation for financial support.

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