Abstract
A certain trade of the information about a technological innovation between the initial owner of the information andn identical producers is studied by means of a cooperative game theoretic approach. The information trading situation is modelled as a cooperative (n+1)-person game with side payments. The symmetrical strong ɛ-cores (including the core), the nucleolus and the kernel of the cooperative game model are determined. Interpretations of these game theoretic solutions and their implications for the information trading problem are given.
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Driessen, T., Muto, S. & Nakayama, M. A cooperative game of information trading: The core, the nucleolus and the kernel. ZOR Zeitschrift für Operations Research Methods and Models of Operations Research 36, 55–72 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01541032
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01541032