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How bad can a voting location be

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Abstract

Two questions concerning the location of a single facility by a voting process are investigated for transportation networks:

  • - What is the maximum number of customers located on the network preferring some rival point over a voting solution?

  • - How does the average distance of the customers to the facility increase when a voting location instead of a Weber location is chosen for the facility?

Complete answers are given for general networks and for certain planar networks, viz., the so-called generalized cacti.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Fachbereich Mathematik, Universität Oldenburg, D-2900, Oldenburg, Federal Republic of Germany

    H. J. Bandelt

  2. Centre d'Economie Mathématique et d'Econométrie, Université Libre de Bruxelles, CP 139, B-1050, Bruxelles, Belgium

    M. Labbé

Authors
  1. H. J. Bandelt
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  2. M. Labbé
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Additional information

This research was carried out during the First EURO Summer Institute on Location Theory held at Brussels, 1984. The paper benefitted from stimulating discussions with Pierre Hansen. The research of the second author was supported by the Action de Recherche Concertée of the Belgian Government under contract 84/8965.

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Bandelt, H.J., Labbé, M. How bad can a voting location be. Soc Choice Welfare 3, 125–145 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00435663

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00435663

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