ISSN:
1522-9602
Quelle:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Thema:
Biologie
,
Mathematik
Notizen:
Abstract Previous game-theoretic models of reciprocity have assumed that populations are large and organisms effectively sessile. This paper analyzes an iterated prisoner's dilemma among non-sessile organisms in a finite population, on the assumption that an individual's chance of remaining in one place is not influenced by a partner's behavior. This mode of interaction is suitable for analyzing potentially cooperative behaviors that are secondary to the advantage of group formation, e.g. allogrooming among social mammals. The analysis yields necessary conditions for stable reciprocity in terms of three parameters, namely, a benefit/cost ratio, the probability of further interaction and the probability of partner retention. The results suggest that, in highly mobile organisms such as fish, birds and mammals, reciprocity may be stable only if the population is small and the relative benefit and future interaction probability are both large.
Materialart:
Digitale Medien
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02459487
