Electronic Resource
Springer
International journal of game theory
19 (1990), S. 219-232
ISSN:
1432-1270
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Mathematics
,
Economics
Notes:
Abstract In a TU cooperative game with populationN, a monotonic core allocation allocates each surplusv (S) among the agents of coalitionS in such a way that agenti's share never decreases when the coalition to which he belongs expands. We investigate the property of largeness (Sharkey [1982]) for monotonic cores. We show the following result. Given a convex TU game and an upper bound on each agent' share in each coalition containing him, if the upper bound depends only upon the size of the coalition and varies monotonically as the size increases, then there exists a monotonic core allocation meeting this system of upper bounds. We apply this result to the provision of a public good problem.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01761077
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