Electronic Resource
Berkeley, Calif.
:
Berkeley Electronic Press (now: De Gruyter)
Review of law and economics
3.2007, 2, art13
ISSN:
1555-5879
Source:
Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals
Topics:
Law
,
Economics
Notes:
This paper shows that unilateral-harm contexts with role-type uncertainty can create incentives similar to bilateral-harm contexts. For this purpose, we show that the result of Dharmapala and Hoffmann (2005), namely that standard liability rules do not lead to efficient care choices by injurer and victim if precaution costs are interdependent and harm is unilateral whereas they can in the case of bilateral harm, depends on role-type certainty.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol3/iss2/art13
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