Electronic Resource
Oxford, UK
:
Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Journal of business finance & accounting
21 (1994), S. 0
ISSN:
1468-5957
Source:
Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
Topics:
Economics
Notes:
In this paper, agency problems between stockholders and debtholders are considered in a simple model of the firm's optimal production decision. It is shown that in the presence of debt financing other than a production loan, the firm is motivated to underproduce, an agency problem analogous to Myers' classic underinvestment problem. If a production loan is employed in lieu of these other forms of debt, the underproduction problem is rectified.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5957.1994.tb00330.x
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