ISSN:
1572-9966
Keywords:
D74
;
F15
;
H77
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Economics
Notes:
Abstract In the absence of oppression, citizens of a sub-unit who contemplate secession carefully weigh the benefits and costs of different outcomes. Here these costs are shown to be highly variable: they depend on the strategic behavior of each state and on whether cooperative relations would be re-established after secession. Using Quebec as a case, it is shown that threats of non-cooperation by the predecessor state may be discounted as not credible. Elementary game theory, however, shows that, with repeat play, retaliatory non-cooperation could be a rational strategy. Moreover, it is shown that reaching a compromise solution requires a credible threat on the part of the potential secessor to accept a sovereignty where there would be no economic cooperation. In modern welfare states, these risks are severe enough to make secession rare, and incremental constitutional change the norm.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02393148
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