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  • 1
    ISSN: 1432-0495
    Keywords: Key words Soil erosion ; Radiocesium ; Depositional rates ; Dolines
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Geosciences
    Notes: Abstract  Three dolines (sinkholes), each representing different land uses (crop, grass, and forest) in a karst area in East Tennesse, were selected to determine soil erosional and depositional rates. Three methods were used to estimate the rates: fallout radiocesium (137Cs) redistribution, buried surface soil horizons (Ab horizon), and the revised universal soil loss equation (RUSLE). When 137Cs redistribution was examined, the average soil erosion rates were calculated to be 27 t ha–1 yr–1 at the cropland, 3 t ha–1 yr–1 at the grassland, and 2 t ha–1 yr–1 at the forest. By comparison, cropland erosion rate of 2.6 t ha–1 yr–1, a grassland rate of 0.6 t ha–1 yr–1, and a forest rate of 0.2 t ha–1 yr–1 were estimated by RUSLE. The 137Cs method expressed higher rates than RUSLE because RUSLE tends to overestimate low erosion rates and does not account for deposition. The buried surface horizons method resulted in deposition rates that were 8 t ha–1 yr–1 (during 480 yr) at the cropland, 12 t ha–1 yr–1 (during 980 yr) at the grassland, and 4 t ha–1 yr–1 (during 101 yr) at the forest site. By examining 137Cs redistribution, soil deposition rates were found to be 23 t ha–1 yr–1 at the cropland, 20 t ha–1 yr–1 at the grassland, and 16 t ha–1 yr–1 at the forest site. The variability in deposition rates was accounted for by temporal differences;137Cs expressed deposition during the last 38 yr, whereas Ab horizons represented deposition during hundreds of years. In most cases, land use affected both erosion and deposition rates – the highest rates of soil redistribution usually representing the cropland and the lowest, the forest. When this was not true, differences in the rates were attributed to differences in the size, shape, and closure of the dolines.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Group decision and negotiation 5 (1996), S. 263-282 
    ISSN: 1572-9907
    Keywords: social choice function ; strategy-proofness ; manipulability ; strong and exact consistency ; voting method ; balanced voting
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Psychology
    Notes: Abstract We consider the proportion of profiles at which an anonymous neutral social choice function cannot be manipulated to any coalition's advantage. We fix the number of alternatives and consider the limit as the number of individuals goes to infinity, and assume that the limit of the fraction of all profiles in the domain is 1. We show that there is a continuous function on “profile vectors’ which gives the maximum probability of strategy-proofness, and that this is strictly between 0 and 1 for three alternatives. We also analyze a number of common social choice functions along these lines.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Group decision and negotiation 5 (1996), S. 263-282 
    ISSN: 1572-9907
    Keywords: social choice function ; strategy-proofness ; manipulability ; strong and exact consistency ; voting method ; balanced voting
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Psychology
    Notes: Abstract We consider the proportion of profiles at which an anonymous neutral social choice function cannot be manipulated to any coalition's advantage. We fix the number of alternatives and consider the limit as the number of individuals goes to infinity, and assume that the limit of the fraction of all profiles in the domain is 1. We show that there is a continuous function on “profile vectors’ which gives the maximum probability of strategy-proofness, and that this is strictly between 0 and 1 for three alternatives. We also analyze a number of common social choice functions along these lines.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
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