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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Properties of consistent voting systems (1981)
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 10 (1981), S. 45-52 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract We consider exactly and strongly consistent voting functions where the alternative set is the set of real numbers and each person's preference ordering is determined by a utility function ¦x−x*¦ wherex * is his most preferred alternative. We prove that a voting function which is continuous, anonymous, weakly Pareto, and strongly and exactly consistent must coincide with a class of generalized medians studied byMoulin [1978]. Thus, such a function is actually strategyproof. The continuity assumption can be weakened a little, but we give an example of a noncontinuous function which is strongly and exactly consistent, anonymous, and weakly Pareto, but is not strategyproof.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01770070
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    On groups in varieties of semigroups (1978)
    Springer
    Semigroup forum 16 (1978), S. 201-202 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-2137
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02194630
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Orders of subsemigroups of Tn (1978)
    Springer
    Semigroup forum 16 (1978), S. 203-203 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-2137
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02194631
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Statistical manipulability of social choice functions (1996)
    Springer
    Group decision and negotiation 5 (1996), S. 263-282 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-9907
    Keywords: social choice function ; strategy-proofness ; manipulability ; strong and exact consistency ; voting method ; balanced voting
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Psychology
    Notes: Abstract We consider the proportion of profiles at which an anonymous neutral social choice function cannot be manipulated to any coalition's advantage. We fix the number of alternatives and consider the limit as the number of individuals goes to infinity, and assume that the limit of the fraction of all profiles in the domain is 1. We show that there is a continuous function on “profile vectors’ which gives the maximum probability of strategy-proofness, and that this is strictly between 0 and 1 for three alternatives. We also analyze a number of common social choice functions along these lines.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00554121
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Statistical manipulability of social choice functions (1996)
    Springer
    Group decision and negotiation 5 (1996), S. 263-282 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-9907
    Keywords: social choice function ; strategy-proofness ; manipulability ; strong and exact consistency ; voting method ; balanced voting
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Psychology
    Notes: Abstract We consider the proportion of profiles at which an anonymous neutral social choice function cannot be manipulated to any coalition's advantage. We fix the number of alternatives and consider the limit as the number of individuals goes to infinity, and assume that the limit of the fraction of all profiles in the domain is 1. We show that there is a continuous function on “profile vectors’ which gives the maximum probability of strategy-proofness, and that this is strictly between 0 and 1 for three alternatives. We also analyze a number of common social choice functions along these lines.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02400947
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Additive endomorphisms of rings (1981)
    Springer
    Periodica mathematica Hungarica 12 (1981), S. 241-242 
    Details
    ISSN: 1588-2829
    Keywords: Primary 16A44, 16A72 ; Endomorphism ; generator ; ring endomorphism
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics
    Notes: Abstract We characterize finite rings all of whose additive endomorphisms are multiplicative also.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01849611
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
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