ISSN:
1432-1270
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Mathematics
,
Economics
Notes:
Abstract We consider exactly and strongly consistent voting functions where the alternative set is the set of real numbers and each person's preference ordering is determined by a utility function ¦x−x*¦ wherex * is his most preferred alternative. We prove that a voting function which is continuous, anonymous, weakly Pareto, and strongly and exactly consistent must coincide with a class of generalized medians studied byMoulin [1978]. Thus, such a function is actually strategyproof. The continuity assumption can be weakened a little, but we give an example of a noncontinuous function which is strongly and exactly consistent, anonymous, and weakly Pareto, but is not strategyproof.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01770070
