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  • 1
    Unknown
    Washington, D.C : Brookings Institution Press
    Keywords: Bank failures, Government policy, United States. ; Bank failures, United States. ; Banks and banking, State supervision. ; Intervention (Federal government)
    Notes: Introduction : our message and methods -- What is the problem? -- Why protection is costly -- How pervasive is TBTF? -- Why protect TBTF creditors? -- The growth of TBTF protection -- Testing our thesis : the cases of not too big to fail -- Can the problem be addressed? -- Creating the necessary foundation -- Reducing policymakers' uncertainty -- Limiting creditor losses -- Restricting payment system spillovers -- Alternatives for managing too big to fail -- Summary : talking points on too big to fail
    Pages: xiii, 230 p.
    ISBN: 0-8157-9636-6
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Berkeley, Calif. : Berkeley Electronic Press (now: De Gruyter)
    Contributions to macroeconomics 3.2003, 1, art3 
    ISSN: 1534-6005
    Source: Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Some argue that central banks can improve monetary policy by including confidential supervisory assessments of banking organizations in their forecasts of inflation and unemployment. In this study we examine the extent to which forecasts of these variables would have been improved with the inclusion of supervisory data. We begin by reproducing the earlier results used to support the claim. We critically examine them and extend the analysis from in-sample to out-of-sample testing. Finally, we check the robustness of our findings by extending the analysis period, using a different methodology to determine the contribution to forecasts, and substituting a different measure of supervisory information. Our analysis does not support claims that confidential supervisory information would have improved forecasts of inflation. Confidential supervisory information improved forecasts of unemployment in some periods. It is unclear, however, if the frequency or level of improvement would have altered monetary policy in a nontrivial way.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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