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  • 1
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    Estimation of a Bernouilli Parameter: A Normative Approach to Replace the Bayesian One (1989)
    Dordrecht : Periodicals Archive Online (PAO)
    Theory and Decision. 26:3 (1989:May) 253 
    Details
    ISSN: 0040-5833
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    URL: http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:pao:&rft_dat=xri:pao:article:n228-1989-026-03-000003
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Estimation of a Bernouilli parameter: A normative approach to replace the Bayesian one (1989)
    Springer
    Theory and decision 26 (1989), S. 253-262 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: Bernouilli's law ; Bayesian estimation ; prior distribution ; Laplace theory of probability
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract The paper deals with the problem of the estimation of an unknown probability from a finite number of experiments. We propose a normative (axiomatic) solution that restricts the class of admissible estimators to a one-parameter family. Moreover this solution coincides with the one obtained from Bayes theory with a β prior. Thus our results can be interpreted as a justification for the use of Bayesian inference with a β prior.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00134108
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Aggregation of preferences with a variable set of alternatives (2000)
    Springer
    Social choice and welfare 17 (2000), S. 269-282 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-217X
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract. A social choice correspondence called the Essential set is studied with the help of an axiom called Cloning Consistency. Cloning consistency is the requirement that the formal choice rule be insensitive to the replication of alternatives. The Essential set is the support of the optimal mixed strategies in a symmetric two-party electoral competition game.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550050020
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Consistency between tastes and values: A universalization approach (2000)
    Springer
    Social choice and welfare 17 (2000), S. 293-320 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-217X
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract. The object of this paper is to propose a consistency test for an individual involved in collective choice process. Collective choice processes considered in the paper are those that transform individuals ‘tastes’– which reflect the self-interested view point of the individuals – into (social) ranking of alternatives. In addition to her tastes, an individual has values about the way by which collective decision should be made. We distinguish two categories of such values. First, there are end-values that restrict the class of social rankings that the individual considers ethically acceptable. Second there are aggregation-values that specify the way by which the social ranking should depend upon the individuals tastes. The consistency test stands on an hypothetical operation of universalization of the individual tastes to everyone. Five illustrations of the potential usefulness of our approach for interpreting social choice theory and welfare economics are proposed. These illustrations deal with utilitarian aggregation in the presence of income inequality aversion, the so-called ‘ethics of responsibility’ and the aggregation of individual ranking of opportunity sets based on their freedom of choice. A discussion of the relevance of the consistency test for addressing the problem of ‘laundering’ individual preferences is also provided.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550050022
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Comparison functions and choice correspondences (1999)
    Springer
    Social choice and welfare 16 (1999), S. 513-532 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-217X
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract. In this paper, we introduce the concept of a comparison function, which is a mapping g that assigns numbers to ordered pairs of alternatives (x,y) with the property that g(x,y)=−g(y,x). The paper discusses how some well-known choice correspondences on tournaments such as the uncovered set, the minimal covering set and the bipartisan set can be extended to this general framework. Axiomatic characterizations and properties are studied for these correspondences.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550050158
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Interpretation of electoral mixed strategies (2000)
    Springer
    Social choice and welfare 17 (2000), S. 283-292 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-217X
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract. In this paper is remarked that “mixed” strategies in games of electoral competition do not need to be interpreted as random moves. There are two a priori symmetric parties, and a finite (non spatial) set of alternatives. Parties are allowed to take unclear positions, by campaining on a “platform” that is a mix of several alternatives. Each individual nevertheless identifies a party with a single alternative, the number of individuals who identify a party with a given alternative being proportional to the importance of that alternative in the party’s platform.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550050021
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions (1996)
    Springer
    Social choice and welfare 13 (1996), S. 75-93 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-217X
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper introduces a new axiom for choice in preference profiles and tournaments, called composition-consistency. A social choice function is composition-consistent if it is non-sensitive to the cloning of one or several outcomes. The key feature of the composition consistency property is an operation concept called multiple composition product of profiles. The paper provides a brief overview of some social choice functions studied in the literature. Concerning the tournament solutions, it is proved that the Top Cycle, the Slater and the Copeland solutions are not composition-consistent, whereas the Banks, Uncovered Set, TEQ, Minimal Covering Set are composition-consistent. Moreover, we define the composition-consistent hull of a solution ф as the smallest composition-consistent solution containing ф. The composition-consistent hulls of the Top cycle and Copeland solutions are specified, and we give some hints about the location of the hull of the Slater set. Concerning social choice functions, it is shown that Kemeny, Borda and Minimax social choice functions are not composition-consistent, whereas the Paretian one is composition-consistent. Moreover, we prove that the latter is the composition-consistent hull of the Borda and Minimax functions.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00179100
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Slaters's winners of a tournament may not be in the Banks set (1991)
    Springer
    Social choice and welfare 8 (1991), S. 365-369 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-217X
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract An exemple is given of a tournament in which none of the Kemeny-Slater's winners of the tournament belong to the Banks set.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00183047
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    K–Player Additive Extension of Two-Player games with an Application to the Borda Electoral Competition Game (2000)
    Springer
    Theory and decision 48 (2000), S. 129-137 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: Two-player ; Borda electoral competition
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract In this note we introduce the notion of K–player additive extension of a symmetric two-player game and prove a result relating the equilibria in mixed strategies in the two games. Then we apply the result to the Borda electoral competition game.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1005256424944
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