Electronic Resource
Springer
International journal of game theory
25 (1996), S. 437-453
ISSN:
1432-1270
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Mathematics
,
Economics
Notes:
Abstract We give a characterization of the equilibrium payoffs of a dynamic game, which is a stochastic game where the transition function is either one or zero and players can only use pure actions in each stage. The characterization is in terms of convex combinations of connected stationary strategies; since stationary strategies are not always connected, the equilibrium set may not be convex. We show that subgame perfection may reduce the equilibrium set.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01803950
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