Bibliothek

feed icon rss

Ihre E-Mail wurde erfolgreich gesendet. Bitte prüfen Sie Ihren Maileingang.

Leider ist ein Fehler beim E-Mail-Versand aufgetreten. Bitte versuchen Sie es erneut.

Vorgang fortführen?

Exportieren
Filter
Materialart
Erscheinungszeitraum
  • 1
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Berkeley, Calif. : Berkeley Electronic Press (now: De Gruyter)
    Review of law and economics 3.2007, 2, art9 
    ISSN: 1555-5879
    Quelle: Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals
    Thema: Rechtswissenschaft , Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Harsh sanctions are conventionally assumed to primarily benefit vulnerable targets. Contrary to this perception, this article shows that augmented sanctions often serve the less vulnerable targets. While decreasing crime, harsher sanctions also induce the police to shift enforcement efforts from more to less vulnerable victims. When this shift is substantial, augmented sanctions exacerbate--rather than reduce--the risk to vulnerable victims. Based on this insight, this article suggests several normative implications concerning the efficacy of enhanced sanctions, the importance of victims' funds, and the connection between police operations and apprehension rates.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
  • 2
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Berkeley, Calif. : Berkeley Electronic Press (now: De Gruyter)
    Review of law and economics 3.2007, 2, art4 
    ISSN: 1555-5879
    Quelle: Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals
    Thema: Rechtswissenschaft , Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Courts may determine that an offer is irrevocable due to the offeree's reasonable reliance on it. For instance, the landmark case of Drennan v. Star Paving Co. (1958) held a subcontractor's price offer to be irrevocable once it had been relied upon by the general contractor in computing his overall bid. However, a rule of implied irrevocability raises two main difficulties. First, it seems unfair to force the offeror to commit, but not the offeree. Second, from an ex ante perspective, the implied irrevocability rule seems to deter parties from submitting low-priced, unqualified offers. These concerns have led several scholars to argue for modification of the rule. This paper rationalizes the implied irrevocability rule by demonstrating that the above concerns are unfounded. We demonstrate that whereas some restrictions on the offeree's freedom to conduct bid shopping ex post (i.e., after the uncertainties are resolved) are essential in order to allow him to receive viable price offers ex ante, these restrictions need not be absolute nor legally enforced. Partial restrictions, in the form of a self-enforced Binding Range, may well suffice. The plausible existence of a self-enforced Binding Range ensures that offerors have incentives to submit irrevocable bids because they can expect to earn a profit by submitting the best offer. This paper characterizes the optimal size of the Binding Range, and explores what legal provisions should be applied when the self-enforced Binding Range is sub-optimal.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
Schließen ⊗
Diese Webseite nutzt Cookies und das Analyse-Tool Matomo. Weitere Informationen finden Sie hier...