Electronic Resource
Berkeley, Calif.
:
Berkeley Electronic Press (now: De Gruyter)
Frontiers of theoretical economics
1.2002, 1, art1
ISSN:
1534-5955
Source:
Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals
Topics:
Economics
Notes:
A family of ascending package auction models is introduced in which bidders may determine their own packages on which to bid. In the proxy auction (revelation game) versions, the outcome is a point in the core of the exchange economy for the reported preferences. When payoffs are linear in money and goods are substitutes, sincere reporting constitutes a Nash equilibrium and the outcome coincides with the Vickrey auction outcome. Even when goods are not substitutes, ascending proxy auction equilibria lie in the core with respect to the true preferences. Compared to the Vickrey auction, the proxy auctions generate higher equilibrium revenues, are less vulnerable to shill bidding and collusion, can handle budget constraints much more robustly, and may provide better ex ante investment incentives.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://www.bepress.com/bejte/frontiers/vol1/iss1/art1
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