Electronic Resource
Cambridge
:
Cambridge University Press
Philosophy
61 (1986), S. 215-228
ISSN:
0031-8191
Source:
Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
Topics:
Philosophy
Notes:
How, in pursuit of ontological neutrality, should one talk about values? I propose to say: there are values. Those three words do nothing to define within what kind of conception of a world values are at home.1 I take it that the ‘realist’ must have more to say about values and their world (just as a mathematical Platonist does not simply say ‘There are numbers’). I recognize that an ‘anti-realist’ may prefer to talk of value-terms (perhaps with a blind eye to values not so labelled); I ask him to wait and see whether taking the linguistic turn is the only way to put values in their place (also whether values deserve to be singled out for relegation).
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0031819100021070
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