Electronic Resource
Springer
Public choice
37 (1981), S. 343-348
ISSN:
1573-7101
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Economics
Notes:
Conclusion To sum up, one problem posed by critics of franchise bidding is that the unfavorable political participation associated with the present system of regulation would only be accentuated under a franchise scheme. However, we have argued to the contrary that under a franchising scheme political interest could be particularized at the local level. Restricting the franchising body's influence to a specific utility serving a local area decreases monetary cost and increases the incentive of the local regulator to act in the interest of the local constituency. Market forces then would be more active in policing both the franchising body and the firm providing the services.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00138254
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