Bibliothek

X
feed icon rss

Ihre E-Mail wurde erfolgreich gesendet. Bitte prüfen Sie Ihren Maileingang.

Leider ist ein Fehler beim E-Mail-Versand aufgetreten. Bitte versuchen Sie es erneut.

Vorgang fortführen?

Exportieren
  • 1
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    The Optimal Consumption and the Quitting of Harmful Addictive Goods (2007)
    Berkeley, Calif. : Berkeley Electronic Press (now: De Gruyter)
    The @B.E. journal of economic analysis & policy 7.2007, 1, art15 
    Details
    ISSN: 1555-0494
    Quelle: Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: In this paper we study a model of rational consumption and quitting in the context of harmful addictive goods. We assume that a person has imperfect information about his ability to resist and terminate the addiction. We first characterize the optimal consumption path of a non-addicted person, along which his stock of the addictive substance is either always increasing (and thus addiction occurs stochastically), always decreasing, or always unchanged. We then characterize the optimal consumption path of an addicted person, along which he may attempt to quit the addiction for a period of time, and then resume his consumption if the attempt is unsuccessful. Finally, we remark on the issues of regret, multiple attempts to quit, and quitting programs.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/vol7/iss1/art15
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
    Artikel (Nationallizenzen)
    Volltext
  • 2
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Strategic Invasion in Markets with Switching Costs (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: We investigate the role of consumer switching costs in a three-stage model in which the entrant and the incumbent firm set prices sequentially and then the consumers decide from which firm to buy. We characterize the unique subgame perfect equilibrium and find that even an entrant with a higher marginal cost may profitably invade part of the market due to the existence of switching costs. Switching costs benefit both firms but harm consumers. This model is used to understand pricing behavior in the US telecommunications industry.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00521.x
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
    Artikel (Nationallizenzen)
    Volltext
  • 3
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Learning buyers' valuation distribution in posted-price selling (1999)
    Springer
    Economic theory 14 (1999), S. 417-428 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Schlagwort(e): Keywords and Phrases: Price determination, Posted-price selling, Learning. ; JEL Classification Numbers:C61, D42, D82, D83.
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Summary. A dynamic pricing model is studied where a seller of an asset faces a sequence of potential buyers whose valuation distribution is unknown to the seller. The seller learns more about the distribution in the selling process and becomes less optimistic as the object remains unsold. We characterize the optimal posted prices which incorporate updated beliefs every period, and derive a rather tight sufficient condition under which these prices decline over time. An example is provided where the optimal prices can actually increase over time if the condition is violated.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050301
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
    Artikel (Nationallizenzen)
    Volltext
  • 4
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Strategic behavior in dynamic auctions (1993)
    Springer
    Economic theory 3 (1993), S. 501-516 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Summary In this paper, we study a two-period common-value auction model in which the seller possesses some private information about the value of the object being sold. Assuming that buyers possess no private information in the first period, we characterize a set of equilibria in which the strategy of the seller is equivalent to a decision of whether to sell the object in the first or the second period with no reserve price. The seller sells in the second period if and only if the information is favorable enough. We also show that revealing private information increases the seller's profit in some equilibria, but not in others. One implication is that the seller's ability to sell on more occasions reduces his expected revenue under certain conditions.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01209699
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
    Artikel (Nationallizenzen)
    Volltext
  • 5
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    More on phantom bidding (2000)
    Springer
    Economic theory 15 (2000), S. 701-707 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Schlagwort(e): Keywords and Phrases: English auction, Phantom bidding, Fixed/flexible reserve price. ; JEL Classification Numbers: D44.
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Summary. A phantom bidding model is analyzed for a sale auction. The following issues are addressed: the effects of phantom bidding on overall social welfare and buyers' profits. It is shown that social welfare may increase or decrease as the auctioneer switches from the fixed reserve price policy to phantom bidding. The buyers' profits will increase whenever social welfare increases.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050319
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
    Artikel (Nationallizenzen)
    Volltext
  • 6
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Separating equilibria in a continuous-time bargaining model with two-sided uncertainty (2000)
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 29 (2000), S. 229-240 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Schlagwort(e): Key words: Bargaining ; signaling ; delay ; two-sided uncertainty
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Mathematik , Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Abstract. In this paper, we analyze the class of all smooth separating sequential equilibria in a continuous-time bargaining model with two-sided uncertainty. Trade between players occurs whenever there is surplus to be shared and delay is used to signal their valuations. When the buyer and the seller have a common discount rate, we show that the final outcome is unique among all these equilibria: the difference between the highest possible buyer's valuation and the lowest possible seller's valuation always narrows down at a rate exactly equal to the discount rate. When their discount rates differ, the more patient side always reveals his valuation first in the unique smooth separating equilibrium.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001820000037
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
    Artikel (Nationallizenzen)
    Volltext
Schließen ⊗
Diese Webseite nutzt Cookies und das Analyse-Tool Matomo. Weitere Informationen finden Sie hier...