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  • Key words:Groves mechanisms, dominant strategy implementation  (1)
  • Unkown production technologies.  (1)
Materialart
Erscheinungszeitraum
  • 1
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Springer
    Economic theory 13 (1999), S. 689-707 
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Schlagwort(e): Keywords and Phrases: Double implementation Walrasian allocations ; Lindahl allocations ; Unkown production technologies. ; JEL Classification Numbers: C72 ; D51 ; D71 ; H41.
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Summary. This paper considers double implementation of Walrasian allocations and Lindahl allocations in Nash and strong Nash equilibria for both private and public goods economies when preferences, initial endowments, production technologies, and coalition patterns are all unknown to the designer. It will be noted that the mechanisms presented here are feasible and continuous. In addition, unlike most mechanisms proposed in the literature, our mechanism works not only for three or more agents, but also for two-agent economies, and thus it is a unified mechanism which is irrespective of the number of agents.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
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  • 2
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Springer
    Review of economic design 4 (1999), S. 205-218 
    ISSN: 1434-4750
    Schlagwort(e): JEL classification:C72, D71, D82, H41 ; Key words:Groves mechanisms, dominant strategy implementation
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Abstract. This paper provides two theorems which characterize the domains of valuation functions for which there exist Pareto efficient and truth dominant strategy mechanisms (balanced Groves mechanisms). Theorem 1 characterizes the existence of balanced Groves mechanisms for a general class of valuation functions. Theorem 2 provides new balance-permitting domains of valuation functions by reducing the problem of solving partial differential equations to the problem of solving a polynomial function. It shows that a balanced Groves mechanism exists if and only if each valuation function in the family under consideration can be obtained by solving a polynomial function with order less than $n-1$ , where n is the number of individuals.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
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