ISSN:
1573-1502
Schlagwort(e):
enforcement
;
reputation
;
self-reports
Quelle:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Thema:
Energietechnik
,
Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Notizen:
Abstract A policy of effective environmental protection, inthe present political atmosphere, will requirelow-cost monitoring and enforcement (M&E) strategiesthat do not rely on draconian penalties. Infinite oreven very high penalties for environmental violationsare socially and politically unacceptable.Environmental violations are often classed as civiloffenses, and the occurrence of a violation may bethought insufficient to establish intent. If penaltiesare upper-bounded and each firm is inspected randomly,compliance cannot be maintained with arbitrarily smallinspection probabilities and, hence, small agencycosts. In this paper we examine possibilities forreducing agency M&E costs, including the requirementfor self-reports of effluents and the adjustment ofthe inspection probability to reflect a firm'scompliance or reporting reputation.
Materialart:
Digitale Medien
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008348915460
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