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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Aggregation of preferences with a variable set of alternatives (2000)
    Springer
    Social choice and welfare 17 (2000), S. 269-282 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-217X
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract. A social choice correspondence called the Essential set is studied with the help of an axiom called Cloning Consistency. Cloning consistency is the requirement that the formal choice rule be insensitive to the replication of alternatives. The Essential set is the support of the optimal mixed strategies in a symmetric two-party electoral competition game.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550050020
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