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Notizen: Conclusions We have come full circle to the typological procedure which was discussed first: the subsumption of a concrete case study. Actually, and this should be apparent by now, all procedures overlap and differ from each other in the emphasis they put on certain aspects. But nevertheless in doing so two functions seem to stand out: a historical-processual one and a differentiating one. As macrosociological types represent the search for the most inclusive context, both with reference to time and space, one purpose lies therefore in bringing order into the historical dimension which links the various types. Notions of historical processes, of development and change, underlie most typologies. Historical priorities are established either on empirical or hypothetical grounds, usually on both. Which type precedes which and how the transformation or transition from one stage to the next is brought about, usually implies some vision of universal history, of the evolution of mankind. Thus, typologies of macrosociological dimensions serve a preeminently historical-processual function. The second purpose is that of differentiating the general from the unique or particular, as alluded to at the beginning of this article. This implies an imagery of what constitutes the causally most powerful forces and how they make their impact felt. What is and what is not compatible in the concrete case with the overriding essential characteristics of the prototype? How much leeway does there exist for the future (or past) development of the concrete case? Both functions overlap inasfar as they seek to narrow the range of alternatives which is open for the concrete case, be it now in its historical-processual development or in its subsumption aspects under a prototype. This raises new problems for the handling of data and evidence. As it can be assumed that data are in all instances taken primarily from one or more concrete cases, it seems appropriate to rethink the kind of linkage between data and typological procedure which was observed. For the subsumption of a concrete case under a prototype, the problem is not to have sufficient evidence on the concrete case (which invariably is given) but to interpret the data as typological and to differentiate between the general and the unique. Where a concrete case is taken as representing a type, the assumption is to begin with that the typological features have been selected. This assumption is never proven and cannot be proven within the framework of one single case study. A minimum request, therefore, would be to establish comparisons of certain characteristics which are assumed to be typological with other concrete cases which are also subsumed under the type. This is what Inkeles and Bauer practice, but they remain restricted to data on the stratification system. The differentiation between typological and particular characteristics is therefore in greatest need of further elaboration. The filling-out of the common and essential characteristics of a prototype with empirical data has been analyzed partly above. The danger is that the typological categories become so inclusive and abstract that the subsumption of empirical cases can become almost meaningless. Differences between concrete cases which attest to the greater or lesser “fit” with the prototype or greater or lesser compatibility, tend to get lost. But it is precisely these differences in compatibility, the emergence of contradictions of all sorts, which contain the nucleus for future change. The specification of these contradictions undoubtedly is Eisenstadt's greatest contribution to typological procedures. But are there ways to distinguish which contradictions can or will be contained and which ones not, other than viewed ex post facto? Processual typologies are quite adept in handling a wealth of historical data, as they proceed on the basis of comparisons between concrete cases, which are then built up to form larger generalizations. There is the danger, however, of falling victim to a narrow historicism. Furthermore, the kind of generalizations which are made have to be based on what Bendix once called “natural pairs”, i.e., they are restricted to cases which show a sufficient number of resemblances to warrant a comparison to begin with. This will make for regional, cultural, and periodicized groupings. Germany and Japan are such a natural pair par excellance, as might be Ghana and the Ivory Coast for developing nations today. Although this offers the advantage of accumulation of knowledge about these societies, other “singles” will be neglected. Aside from regional differences, which are inevitable given the nature of the task, among the most conspicuous absentees are the smaller countries (which are accorded attention, however, under a project designed explicitly to end this neglect) and such marginal or seedbed societies as ancient Greece and Israel. Moore is aware of this problematic and justifies his selection of countries on the basis that it was within the larger societies that political innovations such as communism or fascism first took place, while they spread afterwards to the smaller ones. But it could also be argued that smaller nations skipped certain developments (e.g., feudalism in Scandinavia) which the larger ones went through. Is it true that there is not sufficient ground here for comparisons? The other basis for comparisons, of course, is that of selecting universal traits which not only all societies are presumed to have, but which also obliterate many distinctions between developing and developed countries42. Here, however, the conceptual distinctions must necessarily become so abstract to make comparisons of concrete cases superfluous. A middle ground has been pursued by historians who attempt to assess differences in various historical institutions at different times and places of occurrence and link them to subsequent developments43. Barrington Moore's chapter on peasant revolutions represents another effort to extract a number of common sociological components in otherwise quite diversified incidents of peasant revolutions. By and large, however, this kind of “directed” comparison in view of forming larger types which goes beyond natural pair comparisons, has been quite limited so far. Typological procedures in macrosociological studies offer several tempting advantages in view of summarizing macrosociological dimensions which are found in otherwise very differing contexts and to group together various types in a diachronic or synchronic fashion, which also allows for a synthesized explanatory account of the most inclusive scope. Typological procedures are, however, beset with many difficulties stemming from the way in which they are open to empirical validation. The problems of operationalizing a prototype so that various subtypes can be distinguished or empirical cases differentiated in their typological and concrete features await further solutions.