Electronic Resource
Oxford, UK and Boston, USA
:
Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
Real estate economics
32 (2004), S. 0
ISSN:
1540-6229
Source:
Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
Topics:
Economics
Notes:
This paper investigates the phenomenon of sale and leasebacks as one way in which firms may use financial contracts to rearrange their organizational architecture. A theoretic model links the length of initial leaseback period to incentives to make noncontractible future investments in the lease relationship and predicts that firms choose shorter leases when landlords make relatively important investments. Using a sample of 71 sale and leaseback events from the 1990s, we document a significant mean abnormal return of 1.3% for shareholders of seller/lessee firms announcing relatively short leasebacks. The evidence suggests that firms may use sale and leasebacks to optimize their claims to real estate.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1080-8620.2004.00105.x
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