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  • 2020-2023  (1)
  • 2010-2014  (4)
  • 2021  (1)
  • 2014  (4)
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  • 2020-2023  (1)
  • 2010-2014  (4)
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  • 1
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    Network Spot Checking Games: Theory and Application to Toll Enforcing in Transportation Networks (2014)
    Details
    Publication Date: 2020-08-05
    Description: We introduce the class of spot-checking games (SC games). These games model problems where the goal is to distribute fare inspectors over a toll network. In an SC game, the pure strategies of network users correspond to paths in a graph, and the pure strategies of the inspectors are subset of edges to be controlled. Although SC games are not zero-sum, we show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed by linear programming. The computation of a strong Stackelberg equilibrium is more relevant for this problem, but we show that this is NP-hard. However, we give some bounds on the \emph{price of spite}, which measures how the payoff of the inspector degrades when committing to a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we demonstrate the quality of these bounds for a real-world application, namely the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways.
    Language: English
    Type: reportzib , doc-type:preprint
    Format: application/pdf
    Format: application/pdf
    Format: application/pdf
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 2
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    Optimal Designs for Steady-state Kalman filters (2014)
    Details
    Publication Date: 2020-08-05
    Description: We consider a stationary discrete-time linear process that can be observed by a finite number of sensors. The experimental design for the observations consists of an allocation of available resources to these sensors. We formalize the problem of selecting a design that maximizes the information matrix of the steady-state of the Kalman filter, with respect to a standard optimality criterion, such as $D-$ or $A-$optimality. This problem generalizes the optimal experimental design problem for a linear regression model with a finite design space and uncorrelated errors. Finally, we show that under natural assumptions, a steady-state optimal design can be computed by semidefinite programming.
    Language: English
    Type: reportzib , doc-type:preprint
    Format: application/pdf
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    OPUS
  • 3
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    The Price of Spite in Spot-checking games (2014)
    Details
    Publication Date: 2020-08-05
    Description: We introduce the class of spot-checking games (SC games). These games model problems where the goal is to distribute fare inspectors over a toll network. Although SC games are not zero-sum, we show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed by linear programming. The computation of a strong Stackelberg equilibrium is more relevant for this problem, but we show that this is NP-hard. However, we give some bounds on the \emph{price of spite}, which measures how the payoff of the inspector degrades when committing to a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we demonstrate the quality of these bounds for a real-world application, namely the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways.
    Language: English
    Type: conferenceobject , doc-type:conferenceObject
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    OPUS
  • 4
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    The Price of Spite in Spot-checking games (2014)
    Details
    Publication Date: 2020-08-05
    Description: We introduce the class of spot-checking games (SC games). These games model problems where the goal is to distribute fare inspectors over a toll network. Although SC games are not zero-sum, we show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed by linear programming. The computation of a strong Stackelberg equilibrium is more relevant for this problem, but we show that this is NP-hard. However, we give some bounds on the \emph{price of spite}, which measures how the payoff of the inspector degrades when committing to a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we demonstrate the quality of these bounds for a real-world application, namely the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways.
    Language: English
    Type: reportzib , doc-type:preprint
    Format: application/pdf
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    OPUS
  • 5
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    Restricted Adaptivity in Stochastic Scheduling (2021)
    Details
    Publication Date: 2021-09-30
    Description: We consider the stochastic scheduling problem of minimizing the expected makespan on m parallel identical machines. While the (adaptive) list scheduling policy achieves an approximation ratio of 2, any (non-adaptive) fixed assignment policy has performance guarantee Ω(logm/loglogm). Although the performance of the latter class of policies are worse, there are applications in which non-adaptive policies are desired. In this work, we introduce the two classes of δ-delay and τ-shift policies whose degree of adaptivity can be controlled by a parameter. We present a policy - belonging to both classes - which is an O(loglogm)-approximation for reasonably bounded parameters. In other words, an exponential improvement on the performance of any fixed assignment policy can be achieved when allowing a small degree of adaptivity. Moreover, we provide a matching lower bound for any δ-delay and τ-shift policy when both parameters, respectively, are in the order of the expected makespan of an optimal non-anticipatory policy.
    Language: English
    Type: article , doc-type:article
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    OPUS
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