ISSN:
1573-2878
Keywords:
Two-person zero-sum poker games
;
minimax optimal solutions
;
size of bet
;
bluffing strategies
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Mathematics
Notes:
Abstract This paper considers a continuous model of two-person poker, where the maximal amount of betB is assumed and the player who acts first chooses the amount of bet in the game. We analyze a model, in which the range of the amount of bet β is a finite interval [0,B], 0≤B〈+∞, to obtain a saddle point of the payoff function as a pair of optimal strategies among mixed strategies. We compare our results with those of Karlin and Restrepo and those of Newman.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00938482
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