ISSN:
1573-708X
Keywords:
environmental protection
;
international trade
;
Pigouvian tax
;
pollution damage
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Economics
Notes:
Abstract In this Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model, production of a pollutive good damages production of another good within the same country. Unilateral and bilateral shifts from laissez faire to Pigouvian policy are numerically simulated for cases of low emissions and a high volume of trade, high emissions and a high volume of trade, and finally, high emissions and a low volume of trade. A country can be worse off when it becomes Pigouvian and it can be worse off when its trading partner becomes Pigouvian. Nevertheless, a simple game theory version of the model suggests a “race to the top”, in which all countries become Pigouvian.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008313414694
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