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  • 1
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Long-Term or Short-Term Managerial Incentive Contracts (1996)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 5 (1996), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper deals with the strategic role of the temporal dimension of contracts in a duopoly market. Is it better for a firm to sign long-term incentive contracts with managers or short-term contracts? For the linear case, with strategic substitutes (complements) in the product market, the incentive variables are also strategic substitutes (complements). It is shown that a long-term contract makes a firm a leader in incentives, while a short-term contract makes it a follower. We find that, under Bertrand competition, in equilibrium one firm signs a long-term contract and the other firm short-term incentive contracts; however, under Cournot competition, the dominant strategy is to sign long-term incentive contracts.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00343.x
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
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  • 2
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Corporate merger, organizational form, and control of labor (2000)
    Springer
    Spanish economic review 2 (2000), S. 129-144 
    Details
    ISSN: 1435-5477
    Schlagwort(e): JEL classification: J51, L22, L40 ; Key words: Mergers, multiproduct firms, wage bargaining
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Abstract. This paper shows that, when two firms merge, the increase in the bargaining strength of the multiproduct firm arising from the merger when negotiating uniform wages with the workers is one of the reasons that account for corporate mergers. Moreover, there is a strategic variable that can be used to decrease union rents in the case of merging, namely, the organization of production decisions.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/PL00011437
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
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