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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Long-Term or Short-Term Managerial Incentive Contracts (1996)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 5 (1996), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper deals with the strategic role of the temporal dimension of contracts in a duopoly market. Is it better for a firm to sign long-term incentive contracts with managers or short-term contracts? For the linear case, with strategic substitutes (complements) in the product market, the incentive variables are also strategic substitutes (complements). It is shown that a long-term contract makes a firm a leader in incentives, while a short-term contract makes it a follower. We find that, under Bertrand competition, in equilibrium one firm signs a long-term contract and the other firm short-term incentive contracts; however, under Cournot competition, the dominant strategy is to sign long-term incentive contracts.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00343.x
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Corporate merger, organizational form, and control of labor (2000)
    Springer
    Spanish economic review 2 (2000), S. 129-144 
    Details
    ISSN: 1435-5477
    Keywords: JEL classification: J51, L22, L40 ; Key words: Mergers, multiproduct firms, wage bargaining
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract. This paper shows that, when two firms merge, the increase in the bargaining strength of the multiproduct firm arising from the merger when negotiating uniform wages with the workers is one of the reasons that account for corporate mergers. Moreover, there is a strategic variable that can be used to decrease union rents in the case of merging, namely, the organization of production decisions.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/PL00011437
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
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